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Thesis Abstract 
“Never again” expressed the commitment made by allied forces for the prevention of 
genocide.  In the 59 years since the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has evolved into an erga omnes obligation and a 
jus cogen (preemptory) norm.  Genocide prevention, however, remains a highly 
controversial issue as it draws from the concept of universality central to human rights 
discourse at the same time as it changes dominant conceptualizations of state sovereignty. 
This thesis assesses the effectiveness of existing practices, norms and risk assessment/ 
genocide early warning systems in reducing the occurrence of genocide.  To frame the 
work of this thesis Bruce Cronin‟s theory on International Protection Regimes (IPRs) is 
used, for its emphasis on the need for international actors to work toward the “common 
good” in order to realize a stable and secure international order.  Three cases studies 
(Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur) are used to help determine what prevention measures were 
in place. More specifically, the cases are examined for their effectiveness in: 1) 
monitoring on-going and/or escalating conflicts; 2) disseminating information to relevant 
individuals in a timely manner; and 3) mobilizing actors‟ response to and prevention of 
genocide.  The hypothesis that guides my thesis is that only by instituting more efficient 
and comprehensive prevention mechanisms will genocide be deterred and global security 
promoted.  The analysis leads to the conclusion that although, the introduction of the 
notion of a responsibility to protect, the subsidization of preventive mechanisms, and the 
creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide the 
international community have had a significant impact, there needs to be more efficient 
visible and targeted institutional measures put in place. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Never again” expressed the commitment made by allied forces to the prevention 
of genocide in the wake of the Holocaust‟s slaughter of millions.  In the 59 years since 
the international community‟s adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG, Genocide Convention),
1
 the concepts and 
commitments furthered by the CPPG would evolve into a binding norm within the 
international system.
2
  However, the expression “never again” which served as a vehicle 
for the creation of the international human rights regime‟s genocide subdivision is also 
used by scholars to critique the international community‟s poor record in preventing 
massive and systematic murder in many countries.
3
  The 1,000,000 deaths in Rwanda and 
225,000 deaths in Bosnia in the 1990s, and over 300,000 in present day Sudan are the 
most recent and glaring cases highlighting the international community‟s lack of resolve 
in upholding its responsibility to prevent.
4
  To date genocide has taken four times more 
lives than civil or international wars combined, between 12 to 22 million since 1945.
 5
 
While the inhumane slaughter of defenseless populations should mobilize the 
international community on a moral basis, the overall cost of genocide is not 
limited to distant “others” whom we cannot see or hear.  The reality is that mass 
                                                 
1
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide would be adopted in the 
December 1948 General Assembly Resolution 260.  The convention would go into effective on January 
1951. 
2
 This argument is made due to the ratification of this convention by over 140 states and statements made 
by the ICTR in their rulings. Additionally the Office of the Special Advisor would argue that genocide 
convention has evolved into customary law, binding all states to the goals of the convention. 
3
 See Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73.; Mark 
Levene.  Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume 1: The Meaning of Genocide. New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2005.; and Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations. 
Journal of Genocide Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542. 
4
 Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73. Table 
1- Genocide and Politicides from 1955 to 2001, pp. 60. 
5
 Ibid, pp. 57. 
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killings of this kind greatly threaten international peace and security.  As state 
sponsored terror, genocide results in short and long term loss of human capital 
and stunted economic and developmental potential which is further exacerbated 
by the flight of foreign direct investments.
6
 Barbara Harff draws a correlation 
between prior internal conflicts and a habituation of violence that is woven into 
the fabric of society highlighting the potential long term affects.
7
  Additionally, 
significant internal displacement, large refugee flows and destabilizing effects 
within the region (exemplified in cases such as the Republic of Rwanda, Bosnia 
and Sudan) highlight genocide as a leading concern for the international 
community.   
In this thesis, I consider the totality of the genocide regime
8
 and offer some 
suggestions regarding improving prevention measures.  I will examine the international 
system‟s existing efforts at prevention in the context of the following hypothesis: I 
believe that instituting comprehensive preventive mechanisms that will deter 
genocide is essential for the promotion of peace and security within the international 
community.   
As illustrations of genocide and genocide prevention I will use the cases of 
Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur.  The cases have been selected for their occurrence in the 
                                                 
6
 Damien de Walque.  “The Socio-Demographic Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Period in Cambodia.” 
Population Studies, 60(2), (July 2006): 223-231, pp. 223. 
7
 Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955," American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73, pp. 62. 
8
 For the purpose of this work Andreas Hassenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Ruttberger further develop 
Stephen Krasner‟s 1983 definition of “regime” as “sets of […] principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a give area of international relations”  
and include “transnational network of issue experts who share both a body of causal knowledge 
regarding the physical or social processes that require international action and a vision of a better public 
policy which they seek to help materialize.”  For more on regimes see Andreas Hassenclever, Peter 
Mayer, & Volker Ruttberger.  “Integrating Theories of International Regimes.”  Review of International 
Studies, 26(2000): 3- 33, pp. 7 and Stephen D. Krasner. (Ed.) International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983. 
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post Cold War (20
th
- 21
st
 Century) a time when greater harmony of interests was 
expected from the permanent members of the Security Council.  All cases occurred after 
the adoption of the Genocide Convention; they entailed large losses of lives and were 
internationally recognized as volatile situations.  The examples have the ability to inform 
our understanding of the genocide preventions in place at the time and the strengths and 
weaknesses of these practices, as well as the genocide regime‟s evolution.   
Academically and politically the treatment of genocide detection, reduction or 
eradication has been inconsistent, underdeveloped and selective. Scholars have viewed 
Genocide Studies as expressing the ideal of prevention, but less than a quarter of existing 
literature directly addresses this challenge.
9
  Within the international system only a 
handful of active monitoring and response mechanisms are currently in place and these 
are handicapped by political rhetoric and bureaucratic inefficiencies that reduce the 
urgency and importance of the topic.  The sporadic and discriminatory identification or 
labeling of this crime has been largely conditioned by political exchanges which place 
alliances before lives.  Furthermore, the international community‟s inefficiencies have 
encumbered efforts toward mobilization and ignored the fact that genocide ultimately 
threatens the stability of the entire international system and the legitimacy of the notion 
of the nation state.
10
   
While the precedent for genocide prevention has existed for over a quarter 
century, American and Soviet balance of power concerns throughout the Cold War, and, 
later bureaucratic desensitization, passivity and fixation with neutrality have restrained 
                                                 
9
 Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations.” Journal of Genocide 
Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542. 
10
 Bruce Cronin.  Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in International 
Society.  Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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the development of genocide prevention mechanisms.  The 1990s introduction of a 
number of punishment mechanisms that would add greater clarity and accountability to 
the regime
11
 would leave the preventive mechanisms identified by the CPPG dormant and 
unattended to. At least partly due to this lack of international preventive mechanisms, 
states have used violence against their populace beyond the scope of their normative 
rights, resulting in more than 30 genocidal cases since 1945.
12
   
Lacking consensus over the definition of genocide and the legality and legitimacy 
of intervention for humanitarian purposes, the international community has failed to 
progress toward a comprehensive preventive mechanisms.  The 1948 CPPG defines 
genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group.”13  This definition remains highly debated due to its exclusion 
of political groups, and vagaries regarding group identity, intent and the necessary scope 
or number of deaths that are needed before an event is categorized as a genocide.  
However, rulings and declarations made by the United Nations General Assembly, 
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal 
Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court‟s (ICC) preparatory 
commission in recent years have expanded and clarified the CPPG‟s text and provided 
substance for international mobilization.   
A major obstacle to genocide prevention has been and will continue to be political 
will in developed countries.  As Mark Levene argues, the true scope of prevention is 
                                                 
11
 Deemed by Geoffrey Robertson as the third phase of human rights development.  See Geoffrey 
Robertson. Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice.  New York:  The New Press, 
2006, preface. 
12
 Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73. 
13
  “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 9 December 1948, 78. 
United Nations Treaty Series, 277. 
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limited based on what he sees as the contending interests and will of major powers in the 
international community, as well as that of the international society and the dominant 
power (hegemon).
14
  Findings from the thesis show the importance of political will in 
determining a mission‟s success.  Wayne Sandholtz warns us against such a narrow 
perspective as he points out that norms are not affected by one individual state but evolve 
in a social context.  Bruce Cronin addresses Levene‟s critique by emphasizing the need 
for transparency in preventive measures by limiting the scope of intervention.  He further 
stresses the need for political will to prosecute offenders, allies or foes alike.  
Furthermore, Martha Finnemore argues that growing trends regarding humanitarian 
intervention have sidestepped geostrategic considerations.   
In a significant step toward genocide prevention, UN Secretary- General Kofi 
Annan laid out a five point UN Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and established the UN 
Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) in April of 2004.  
However, the office of the SAPG‟s practices in identifying and responding to escalating 
cases leaves future genocide prevention in the same bureaucratic hands, and open to the 
same public relations bargaining that prevented timely action in Rwanda.
 15
  What 
happened to the promise, “Never again?”  
Recent actions by the United Nations and the international community illustrate 
the growing strength and influence of human rights.  From the creation of international 
courts and tribunals to try the crime of genocide and other heinous crimes to 
                                                 
14
 Timothy Longman. “Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide.” 
Journal of Genocide Research 6(1), (March 2004): 29- 45.  
15
 Lawrence Woocher.  Developing a Strategy, Methods, and Tools for Genocide Early Warning.  
Columbia University, Center for International Conflict Resolution: September 2006. 
http://www.un.org/ar/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Woocher%20Early%20warning%20report,%202006-
11-10.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010). 
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interdepartmental coordination of early warning and action, significant efforts have been 
made in the international political arena which promise to greatly reduce the occurrence 
of the crime.  However, a missing component to genocide prevention is an internationally 
coordinated, effective, and early response to increasing violence and genocidal rhetoric.  
While the international community may not necessarily be able to respond to and become 
a constructive agent in all conflicts, it can reduce the number of outbreaks and reduce the 
spillover costs which have long-term destabilizing effects.  Fleshing out a comprehensive 
approach to genocide identification and prevention will help promote international 
security and peace.   
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN 
As noted in chapter 1, the international community‟s failure to work toward the 
dual goals of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (CPPG, Genocide Convention) has caused significant loss of 
lives, economic degradation, increased refugee flows, and global and regional instability.   
By allowing genocidal attacks on civilians to go unchecked, the international community 
has allowed for a habituation of violence which will continue to loom as a threat to 
international peace and stability.
1
  As a result, my hypothesis is that only by instituting 
more efficient and comprehensive prevention mechanisms will genocide be deterred 
and security promoted within the international community.   
In order to validate my assertions I have selected the 1994 Rwanda, 1995 Bosnia, 
and 2003 Sudan cases to determine what if any prevention measures were in place at the 
time of the crisis and how efficient were they.  In the course of my discussion, I will 
illustrate how evolving norms and practices within the global genocide regime have 
changed on such topics as the conceptual utility and validity of the term „genocide,‟ and 
attitudes toward global intervention and how the community has increasingly addressed 
the gray areas regarding genocide prevention.  Discussing these topics will allow me to 
gauge what kind of preventive mechanisms can be developed within the current 
international structure, the probable limitations and the effectiveness of such measures. 
                                                 
1
 Barbara Harff. "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955," The American Political Science Review, 97(1), (February 2003): 57-73.; 
Barbara Harff.  “The Development and Implementation of Genocide Early Warning Systems: Conceptual 
and Practical Issues.” In The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: Genocide a Critical 
Bibliographic Review, Volume 6, edited by Samuel Totten: 63-82. Princeton, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2008. 
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I have used as my basis of selection cases in which there was an overwhelming 
death toll of the targeted population within a short time span, cases that occurred after the 
adoption of the genocide convention, and Cold War and those of international interest.  
These cases will further help illustrate how the concepts of genocide, human rights, 
human dignity, and international responsibility have evolved.  The cases selected, inform 
our understanding of priorities and interests in the current international order.   
To identify in what way each case has helped contribute to the international 
conceptualization and approach to genocide, I will examine the findings, rulings, and 
practices of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
African Union (AU) and other relevant international actors.  By looking at the way in 
which genocide prevention has evolved we can gauge the feasibility of certain policy 
options.  Throughout, I ask what were the prevention systems in place during the crisis 
and whether the systems in place were able to effectively: 1) monitor on-going and/or 
escalating conflicts; 2) disseminate information to policymakers, experts, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) in a timely 
manner; and 3) mobilize state and non- state actors‟ response to and prevention of 
genocide.  I will use a mixture of primary and secondary sources such as journal articles, 
books, and official documents and the findings and rulings of the UN and various courts. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In my research, I aim to assess the effectiveness of existing practices, norms and 
risk assessment/ genocide early warning systems in reducing the occurrence of genocide 
and to determine how a better system might be developed if it is the case that 
   
12 
international practices are ineffective.  As a framework with which to look at the 
genocide prevention regime‟s evolution and future, I will use Bruce Cronin‟s theory on 
international protection regimes (IPRs). According to Cronin, international protection 
regimes (IPRs) are significant for the structural repercussions that are imposed on those 
who are excluded from legal processes and are victims of repression, violence and state 
sponsored terror.  More than a morally sanctioned basis for action, international 
protection regimes serve the “common good” by lending value to the current international 
Westphalian system organization.  The strength of International Protections Regimes is 
found in their ability to affect the long term maintenance of international peace and 
security as it enables the international community to remedy and reduce violent societal 
tensions and conflict which are strong threats to peace. 
To add to Cronin‟s work I use Wayne Sandholtz‟s theory on cycles of 
international norm change and Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm life cycle theory to help us 
place advancements within the genocide regime into context.  The international regime 
regarding genocide has experienced incremental changes as a result of failures and 
successes in the past 20 years.  As genocide and similar events have taken place, a richer 
response has started to emerge.  By identifying how the case studies and genocide 
prevention were situated and justified, we can understand how and what form of change 
is possible.   
 
DEFINING GENOCIDE 
 There is a vast divide between academic and legal scholars with respect to 
the definition of genocide.  Raphael Lemkin first coined the term “genocide,” in the 
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1910s.
2
  However, his work would not go acknowledged until the full disclosure of 
Hitler‟s campaign against European Jews, Blacks, Gypsies and other “undesirables” 
during the Second World War.  Dr. Lemkin conceived of the crime of genocide as aimed 
at: 
… [the] disintegration of the political and social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, 
and the economic existence of national groups, and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, 
and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups.  Genocide is directed against the national group as 
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members 
of the national group.
3
 
 
Yet while the international community adopted Lemkin‟s term it made swift and clear 
departures from Lemkin‟s concept, developing it into a vague and highly contested term.4  
Situated within this departure is an attempt by academic circles to adhere to the original 
definition, scope and intent that was lent to the word by Lemkin, while in legal circles 
this practice is abandoned, and to a certain extent frowned upon.   
 On paper the definition of genocide has arguably remained rather static.  Today 
the texts of the CPPG and the Rome Statue for the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
reflect the original 1948 wording.  But the textbook definition should not mask the fact 
that on an international scale the definition of genocide has been significantly affected by 
the rulings and prosecutions of the two International Criminal Tribunals of the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) established by the United Nations Security 
                                                 
2
 Israel Charney. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Genocide, Volume 1.  Santa Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust 
and Genocide, 1999, pp. 5. 
3
  Raphael Lemkin. “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of Government - 
Proposals for Redress.” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944: 79 - 95. 
4
 Gary Bass. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crime Tribunals.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002. 
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Council, as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), debates in the United Nations 
General Assembly, other international bodies, state practice and academia.  In this respect 
these separate but intersecting arenas of discourse have assisted in the development of the 
human rights, and specifically genocide prevention, regime within the international 
community. 
Following a thread of argumentation within Genocide Studies that attempts to 
return the term to its original conceptualization, Israel Charney argues that genocide 
should be utilized as a generic definition with a categorical number of crimes.  Charney 
reasons that taking a more inclusive approach is more fitting because: 
 a generic definition of genocide does not exclude or 
commit to indifference any case of mass murder of any 
human beings, of whatever racial, national, ethnic, 
biological, sexual, cultural, religious, or political definition, 
or any other definitions, or totally mixed groupings of any 
or all of the above, or random victims who share no 
collective identity other than having been at the same place 
at the same time the mass murder was committed.
5
 
 
For Charney, genocide is broken down into eight different forms of crime ranging from 
the most severe “genocidal massacre” to the less severe crime of “purposeful or negligent 
famine.”6  But in the process he departs greatly from Raphael Lemkin‟s original endeavor 
and the dominant definition, scope and perspective embraced by the international 
community.   
Benjamin A. Valentino and others take a more moderated approach.  For 
example, Valentino argues that:  
                                                 
5
 Israel Charney.  “Classifications of Genocide in Multiple Categories.” In Encyclopedia of Genocide, 
Volume 1, edited by Israel Charney, 6-8.   Santa Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide, 
1999, pp. 6. 
6
 Ibid. 
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because “genocide” is a term of general interest to 
society… and because it carries with it the weight of 
powerful moral sanction, many authors have been reluctant 
to give it up.
7
 
 
Barbara Harff, R. J. Rummel, Leo Kuper, and Benjamin A. Valentino acknowledge 
Charney‟s moral argument but they instead retain the word genocide in much the same 
frame embraced by the international community and utilize other terms to describe 
additional crimes.  As a result democide, politicide and mass killings have started to arise 
within the field to refer to crimes excluded by the CPPG but which are no less important, 
severe or distinct and thus deserving of recognition. 
Helen Fein has constructed a typology of genocides to delineate between different 
motives.  According to Fein three types of genocides can be identified: 1) power driven 
for a) retributive or b) preemptive purposes; 2) developmental; or 3) ideological 
genocide.
8
  Barbara Harff constructs her own typologies which include politically 
motivated killings as well as genocides. Harff‟s typologies are: 1) repressive politicides; 
2) repressive/hegemonical politicides; 3) revolutionary mass murder; and 4) retributive 
politicide.  Harff‟s work highlights the often overlapping political nature of the crime.9   
Genocide studies express the ideal of prevention, yet less than a quarter of 
existing literature directly addresses this challenge.
10
  Academically the treatment of 
genocide reduction or eradication has been inconsistent, underdeveloped and selective. In 
fact as academia has compiled extensive lists of the causes of genocide, often 
                                                 
7
 Benjamin A Valentino. Final Solution: Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20
th
 Century.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. 10. 
8
 Helen Fein.  Human Rights and Wrongs: Slavery, Terror and Genocide.  Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2007, pp. 134-135. 
9
 Barbara Harff & Ted Robert Gurr.  “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: 
Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945.”  International Studies Quarterly, 32(3), 
(September 1988): 359- 371, pp. 361-362. 
10
 Thomas Cushman. “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations.”   Journal of Genocide 
Research 5(4), (December 2003): 523- 542. 
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emphasizing the “accelerators” and “triggers” manipulated by elites, it has obscured the 
viability of prevention by characterizing the problem in terms of its details.  These 
practices have removed the solution to genocide from real tangible action.  In the end we 
are left with Kenneth Waltz‟ wise question “knowledge for what?”11  This is not to say 
that long standing tensions (which are often cited by scholars as genocide‟s accelerators) 
should not be rectified, by ensuring that development/economic practices are more 
inclusive and distributive for greater social equality, or ethnic tensions are reduced by 
teaching tolerance and managing diversity, and/ or making governance and power more 
accessible.
12
  Rather, I argue that immediate international action to address and prevent 
the outbreak of genocidal violence must emphasize the establishment of clear criteria for 
identifying situations as genocide and the creation of mechanisms to assertively act when 
necessary.  My emphasis is on the short- term conditions that are crucial to preventing 
developing situations.   
As Rodger A. Citron argues, the legal realist perspective embraced by some 
academics hinders the international community‟s progress as their strict adherence to 
what the original intent of legal treaties and conventions ends up binding its 
possibilities.
13
  Sandholtz‟s norm change model illuminates how the international 
                                                 
11
 Kenneth N. Waltz. “Law and Theories.”  In Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 27-
46.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
12
 Amy Chua has argued that free market economic models and universal suffrage favored by the west has 
fermented tensions within society.  Israel Charney and Ted Gurr emphasize the ethnic tensions within a 
society.  See Amy Chua.  World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred 
and Global Instability. New York: 1
st
 Anchor Books, 2004.; Israel Charney.  “Genocide Early Warning 
Systems (GEWS).” In Encyclopedia of Genocide, Volume 1, edited by Israel Charney: 6-8. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Institute of the Holocaust and Genocide, 1999.; Barbara Harff  & Ted Robert Gurr.  
“Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 
1945.”  International Studies Quarterly, 32(3), (September 1988): 359- 371. 
13
 Rodger D. Citron. “The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, 
the Revival of Natural Law and the Development of Legal Process Theory.” In The Nuremberg War 
Crimes Trial and its Policy Consequences Today, edited by Beth A. Greich-Polelle.  Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Press, 2009. 
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community‟s tendency to loosely define legal terms has allowed for a certain molding or 
regulating of changes within the international arena that is responsive and conducive to 
the historical climate.  By pulling precedents from a number of sources and constantly 
reinterpreting legal terms and treaties, new possibilities are produced for the international 
community.   
 As already noted the CPPG identifies genocide as a crime under international law.  
It lays out the acts which come to encompass genocide as those “committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”  The acts 
enumerated in Article two subparagraphs (a) through (e) as: 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group
14
 
 
General Assembly resolution 96 defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence of 
entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individuals‟ human 
beings.”15  Further, Quigley argues that those acts enumerated in Article two 
subparagraphs (a) to (e) are “conscious, intentional or volitional acts which an individual 
                                                 
14
 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 9 December 1948, 78. 
United Nations Treaty Series, 277. 
15
 United Nations General Assembly, 1
st
 Session. “Resolution 96 [The Crime of Genocide].” 11 December 
1946, p. 188. (A/RES/64/Add. 1) Official Record.  New York, 1946. 
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could not usually commit without knowing that certain consequences were likely to 
result.”16 
Further the Genocide Convention lays the basis for the unrealized prevention of 
genocide in articles three subparagraphs (b) through (d) and article four.  Article three 
outlines which acts are “punishable by a competent national or international tribunal.”17  
Article three subparagraphs “(b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide; and (d) attempt to commit genocide” all represent crucial 
activities leading up to the outbreak of genocidal activity.
18
  Article four of the genocide 
convention strips “rulers, public officials or private individuals” of their diplomatic 
immunities if found to have taken actions in the planning or execution of genocide.
19
 
It is crucial that we recognize the distinct but complementary relationship that 
exists between crimes against humanity and genocide.  Quigley argues that the 
distinctions between the two crimes are that “crimes against humanity of murder are 
characterized by the mass or systematic character of killings, whereby genocide is 
characterized by an intent to destroy certain specified types of groups.”20  In other words, 
genocide depends on the intentions behind acts while crimes against humanity are the 
context or backdrop in which they take place. When both crimes against humanity and 
genocide occur at the same time it serves as a testament to the severity of the actions 
taking place.  However, the severity of the crime presses us to place less importance to 
the rationale that led each individual to act against their fellow human but the intent of 
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their actions.  This rationale works on both the individual and state level.    Thus the 
central distinction between crimes against humanity and genocide, the factor of 
intentionality, is also equally important in the consideration of a genocide early warning 
system.   
The category of genocide‟s protected groups is highly contested.  As it stands the 
Genocide Convention only identifies national, ethnic, racial and/or religious groups as 
possible victims of mass murder/ extermination.
21
  The International Law Commission 
has taken the stance that the protected groups must be permanent, stable and immutable 
groups whose existence must be recognizable decades after.
22
  However, as the brutality 
of a slew of Latin American dictatorships in the 60s, 70s and 80s highlighted, significant 
human life has been lost as a result of ideological convictions.
23
  Timothy Longman‟s 
discussion of identity in pre and post genocidal Rwanda highlights the fluidity of identity.  
According to Longman, what it meant to be of Batutsi “heritage” had different 
connotations in pre-colonial Rwanda, during colonialism for the Dutch colonizers as well 
as for the colonized, during the Rwanda of the 60s- 80s, during the genocidal campaign 
and during the nation‟s recovery from such atrocities.24   
However, we are left to question what exactly it means to be a group and how is 
determination to take place in pre-conflict situations?  The central question is whether the 
group really exists or if it is a construction or perception of the relevant parties.  The 
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answer is critical to genocide prevention.  Realistically conceptualizing a legitimate and 
internationally accepted response to genocidal situations will rest on the ability of the 
Genocide Early Warning Systems (GEWS) to identify groups which fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Genocide Convention and getting states to support humanitarian 
interventions.  The works of Ratner & Abrams and Quigley highlight the delicate line of 
this debate.  They argue that the ICTR has adopted a subjective approach, with the status 
of group members being determined at birth and continuously passed along to their off 
spring.
25
  On the other hand, the ICTY has taken a more objective approach trying to 
pinpoint identity based on the self identification of the individuals in question, and 
identification by others.
26
    However, we must frame their contributions based on the 
purpose which they serve, as an arena in which crimes are to be tried and are often after 
the conflict ends.  According to the January 2005 Report of the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Security-General,  
the approach taken to determine whether a group is a (fully) 
protected one has evolved from an objective to a subjective 
standard which takes into account that collective identities, 
and in particular ethnicity, are by their very nature social 
constructs.”27   
 
Some consensus between academic and legal scholars can be found in the 
genocide studies field.  Helen Fein defines genocide‟s protected groups as “real groups 
that are the source of identity and exist apart from the invention of the state perpetrators, 
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whose members are persecuted for who they are, not what they have done.” 28 This is 
helpful in establishing what should guide the analysis of protected groups.  Arnold 
Krammer takes a similar stance, arguing that “to be considered genocide, crimes have to 
be committed against groups of people, usually by their government or military power, 
entirely … [based on] human factors that are difficult to change or camouflage.”29      
 John Quigley takes a more structured approach to identifying and defining 
genocide.  To him intent can be defined as “acts against the immediate victims [which] 
must reflect a culpable state of mind in regards to the group.  Thus genocide encompasses 
a dual mental element: one directed against the immediate victims and a second against 
the group.”30  The severity of the crime is not indicated by the number of victims but by 
the existence of both genocide and crimes against humanity.  In this way “the crimes 
against humanity of murder is [sic] characterized by the mass or systematic character of 
the killings, whereas genocide is characterized by an intent to destroy certain specified 
types of groups.”31  
 Based on the literature above, in this thesis genocide is understood as: 
 Severe violation of human rights directly targeting civilian populations; 
 Acts or policies that could logically be concluded to result in the mass death of 
thousands of individuals; 
 Acts where the targeted population is visibly distinguishable from “authors” of such 
acts;  
 Actions undertaken against groups with a distinguishable religious, ethnic, racial 
and/or national character. 
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
Realism with its emphasis on anarchy, power, military force and state survival has 
determined that power-alien
32
 issues have no real effect on state policy or change within 
the international community.  Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, argues that  
… realist(s) cannot be persuaded that we can bring about 
the transformation [of the contemporary world] by 
confronting a political reality that has its own laws with an 
abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.
33
   
 
In Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz argues that interpreting state action on moral 
issues as proof of its singular strength in international relations is committing “… the 
fundamental error of interpreting instances where force is not visible as proof that power 
is not present.”34  Waltz argues that the structural reality of the international system, 
characterized by anarchy, constrains state action within a self-help framework.  In 
essence realists and neorealists argue that, either because of the selfishness of human 
nature or the international structure, states emphasize the national interest in formulating 
foreign policy.  As a result, humanitarian intervention arises only when it is in the 
geostrategic or economic interest of the state or for dubious purposes which mask their 
real intent behind moral proclamations. 
However, because neo-realists and realists alike emphasize the centrality of state 
power and self-interest in international relations, they prove themselves to be dated and 
static, choosing to place emphasis on “things as they are” and not on how and why they 
have or could develop.  Their perspectives fail to account for changes in the international 
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system and greatly lack explanatory power in elucidating why and how humanitarian 
intervention and human rights more broadly, have found traction within the current 
system.  From the shadows of the Cold War many concepts and movements have found 
international support in ways that realists are unable to adequately explain.  Gary J. Bass 
and Robert Koenigsberg are the first to point out that realism‟s nationalist turn borders in 
many ways on the fanatical hazards of religious and ideational cultist exclusion.
35
  
 Liberalism has tried to correct for the errors in realist and neo-realist theorizing by 
underscoring their inadequate and static perceptions.  Holding true in their own 
assessments to points made by realism, such as the anarchic nature of the international 
system, rationality of actors, primacy of the state, and constraints, they argue that 
cooperative opportunities are more prevalent.  Because international relations consist of 
ongoing interactions and communications, the general scenario of Prisoners Dilemma 
central to realism is incorrect.
36
  Their ability to grasp the pluralistic nature of states and 
the role of international organizations, groups and international networks in the 
international arena sheds some light on the creation of regimes.  To liberalists when state 
preferences (molded by internal ideas, interests, and institutions) are consistent among 
states negotiation and coordination is possible for mutual gain.  Andrew Morasvcsik 
argues that: 
while state preferences are (by definition) invariant in 
response to changing interstate political and strategic 
circumstances they may well vary in response to changing 
transnational social context.
37
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Thus genocide prevention in the eyes of liberalist reflects a social ideal or overlapping 
state preferences.  Nonetheless these activities are limited and constrained when 
incompatible with other priorities on their list of preferences.   
In response to realism‟s glaring failure, Alexander Wendt, argues that “anarchy is 
what states make of it.”38 According to Wendt, because “culture, identity, norms and… 
actors‟ interest are not fixed but change and arise out of a social context,”39 states 
interpret, mold and emphasize norms and trends altering state behavior, international law 
and the international structure.
40
  Wayne Sandholtz illustrates how the use of 
“foundational metanorms of international society,” results in the expansion, shape and 
influence on how sovereignty is conceptualized.
41
  Additionally, Sandholtz informs our 
understanding of norms‟ persistence by stressing the dialectic relationship between 
actors‟ interest and the persuasive power norms have in curtailing state behavior once 
established.  These approaches explain why and how moral conviction generates 
significant norm activity.  They place the birth and persistence of norms in state action 
and emphasize the constraining power of norms once they are well defined and integrated 
into the international system. 
Martha Finnemore‟s investigation of the changing purpose of intervention 
illustrates how geostrategic considerations have played an insignificant role in explaining 
humanitarian intervention.  In fact Finnemore argues that, “humanitarian activities in the 
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1990s suggest that human rights claims now trump sovereignty and legitimize 
intervention in ways not previously accepted.”42 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger marry realist, liberalist and constructivist 
approaches to regime formation and participation.  Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 
borrow and expand Stephen Krasner‟s definition of regimes as follows: 
sets of […] principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations … [which are 
promoted by a] transnational network of issue experts who 
share both a body of causal knowledge regarding the 
physical or social processes that require international action 
and a vision of a better public policy which they seek to 
materialize.”43  
 
They integrate the liberalist focus on state preferences, realist on power relations, with 
the “soft” cognitivist emphasis on actors‟ ideational, causal and social impact in the 
international system.   To Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, genocide prevention is 
greater when overall costs do not threaten states‟ interest or security and serve the 
preference of a state with minimal and transparent cost and benefits for all participants.  
They make concessions for ideational commonalities such as moral concerns or visions 
for the international community. 
Bruce Cronin argues that the distinct nature of international protection regimes 
(IPRs), is a result of their ability to look at the larger picture, and address the overall 
stability and survival of the current international system based on sovereign states.  IPRs 
gain legitimacy and influence states‟ participation and adherence to their mission due to 
their ability to address the common good that links the states‟ fundamental goals and 
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existence with that of the overall collective.  Examining the spillover cost of genocide, 
such as regional instability and increased refugee flows highlights the accuracy of 
Cronin‟s description of IPRs.   
Supporting Cronin‟s claim are conclusions drawn from Gary Russell‟s account of 
actions taken by smaller states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Netherland, Spain and Switzerland) as part of the League of Nations in the lead up to the 
Second World War.
44
  Russell argues that when states focus exclusive attention on the 
preservation of the state over the deviant and threatening element within the international 
community, they allow for central norms of the international community to be trampled 
upon and for the introduction of greater anarchy.
45
  Their negligence allows for the 
erosion of the Westphalian belief in the salience of the territorial sovereignty of the state, 
the binding nature of treaties and covenants, and other jus cogen norms.  
Support for Cronin and Russell‟s assessment is found in John H. Herz‟ early writing 
on the repercussions of the current structural nature of the international community after 
the Second World War.  According to Herz: 
beyond organizational, institutional and legal requirements 
the system presupposes for its successful working one main 
politico-psychological datum.  The realization on the part 
of political leadership and public opinion in the various 
countries that every country in the world, be it 
geographically or politically „near‟ to or „remote‟ from the 
location of immediate conflict and aggression has exactly 
the same and a superlative, interest in its suppression.
46
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A system in which security is a collective issue requires greater participation by all 
parties.  States must participate in eliminating genocide and mass atrocities as a common 
good.  
 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 The human rights and human dignity field within the international community has 
struggled to formulate a legitimate base for active engagement and assertive action.     At 
present the international community still lacks the response mechanisms needed to 
prevent the deaths of thousands.  A central failure is an inability to transform genocide 
prevention into a priority among state preferences, to change how discussion on this topic 
takes place, to identify to whom this responsibility falls and what are the contours of 
legitimate intervention for humanitarian purposes.  As a result the international 
community has clothed actions based on moral conviction in a variety of terms in an 
attempt to progress their agenda (such as “right to intervene,” “sovereignty as 
responsibility,” “human security,” “individual sovereignty,” “humanitarian intervention,” 
and “responsibility to protect”).47   
Emphasizing the conflicts of sovereignty, Balakrishnan Rajagopal stresses the 
existence of a dual role for the state: “…on the one hand law needs to constitute itself as 
the “other” of violence to be legitimate; on the other hand it needs to use violence 
instrumentally to preserve power.”48  Viewing states through Rajagopal‟s assessment we 
find states existing within an intricate framework, first as protector of its populace and at 
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the same time wielder of “unbound” recourse to violence.  Because states must articulate 
the boundaries of violence within their territories and abroad to remain legitimate 
genocide prevention is intertwined with larger security and sovereignty concerns.   
Richard A. Koenigsberg‟s urges us to identify the limits of sovereign monopoly on the 
use of force when he asks: “… if the nation-state can sacrifice (kill) its most valuable 
citizens—should it not also have the right to sacrifice (kill) citizens who make no useful 
contribution to society?”49   
Gary J. Bass argues that “humanitarian intervention emerged as a fundamental 
liberal enterprise, wrapped up with the progress of liberal ideals and institutions.”50  
Michael Walzer conceptualized humanitarian intervention as “law enforcement or police 
work”51 in response to activities that “shock the moral conscience of mankind.”52  Gareth 
Evans characterizes it as “military force deployed across borders to protect civilians at 
risk.”53   James Pattison takes a more detailed approached by defining humanitarian 
intervention as “forcible military action by an external agent in the relevant political 
community with the predominant purpose of preventing, reducing or halting an ongoing 
or impending grievous suffering or loss of life.”54  In all three cases there is an emphasis 
on the military nature of this intervention though there is significant divergence on what 
is its goal and the extent to which morality plays a role as a motivation. 
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Humanitarian intervention has led to a divisive discourse within academia and the 
policy world alike.  Because humanitarian intervention has often been framed as a right, 
it has often grappled with legal and political concerns, overshadowing the humanitarian 
and moral imperatives it is intended to address.  According to some scholars, 
humanitarian intervention abides by central tenets of the UN charter when executed 
without the intent “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”55   Yet other advocates argue that it may be an illegal act but it is a politically valid 
one.
56
  A stronger argument is made by non-interventionists who have argued that 
humanitarian intervention is illegal because it violates the principles of sovereign rights 
and a prohibition on the use of force embedded in the UN charter.  Pointing to Article 
2(4)‟s prohibition on the use of force, these scholars argue that any form of intervention 
in the internal affairs of a state is clearly an illegal and illegitimate act regardless of its 
moral basis.
 57
   
Simon Chesterman argues that those who declare the moral strength of 
humanitarian intervention and the moral imperatives that should move international and 
state action are supporting “a recipe for bad policy, bad law, and a bad international 
order.”58  Walzer and Chesterman agree that few if any humanitarian interventions have 
ever taken place without the inclusion of dubious or ulterior motives for engagement.
59
  
Byer argues that intervention has been forwarded as a vision of power without 
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necessarily creating a system of accountability.
60
  The divide on humanitarian 
intervention has been so great that many believe that it has become increasingly 
entrenched within two intransigent camps.  As such it has framed humanitarian crisis as 
gains for the state and provided only two options to addressing these problems, do 
something or do nothing.  In his report to the 63
rd
 meeting of the General Assembly the 
Secretary- General, Ban Ki-Moon, argued that “humanitarian intervention posed a false 
choice between two extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths 
or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened 
populations.”61 
The independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty‟s 2001 
report introduced a new concept which would address the policy and legal inadequacies 
of humanitarian intervention.  Under the term “responsibility to protect,” the commission 
reframed the discussion from the “right to intervene” in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
to the “responsibility to protect”62 a human population.    In essence humanitarian 
intervention has been seen as an extremely state-centric interpretation of moral 
responsibility and responsibility to protect is posed as the way forward.  Carsten Stahn 
argues that recent developments in the international system are “part and parcel of a 
growing transformation of international law from a state-and-governing-elite-based 
system of rules into a normative framework designed to protect certain human and 
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community interest.”63  The creation of international courts and tribunals and a vibrant, 
though rather inconsistent, culture of human rights and security within the international 
community has focused on individual wellbeing as a central component of foreign policy.   
According to Carsten Stahn, “the commission thus used a rhetorical trick: it 
flipped the coin, shifting the emphasis from a politically and legally undesirable right to 
intervene for humanitarian purposes to the less confrontational idea of a responsibility to 
protect.”64  Evans and Sahnoun argue that the responsibility to protect reframed the 
discussion: first, by placing priority on those needing assistance, it emphasized the 
responsibility of the state and second that of the international community; and second, it 
represented an “umbrella concept, embracing not just the “responsibility to react” but the 
“responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as well.65  The new concept 
expanded the dominant understanding of sovereignty as power to one of responsibility 
both internally and externally.  Nevertheless in dividing a responsibility to protect into 
pillars it has allowed for greater discourse and progress to take place. 
Under the rubric of a responsibility to protect the commission identified three 
pillars to fulfilling this responsibility: “the enduring responsibility of the State to protect 
its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crime against humanity”;66 “the commitment of the international community to assisting 
states in meeting those obligations”;67 and “the responsibility of Member States to 
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respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to 
provide such protection.”68 This position advocated for a more thorough and inclusive 
practice that encompassed “diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means”69 and 
emphasizes shared responsibilities.  The approach moves away from a complete emphasis 
on intervention and draws the community to consider a spectrum of actions that may help 
reduce and prevent conflict.   
However, the responsibility to protect is only a step forward and not a full 
solution to our problems regarding intervention.  As Carston Stahn argues, responsibility 
to protect is a “multifaceted concept with various elements.”70   He argues that cutting 
across statements made by the International Commission on State Sovereignty and 
Intervention, High-Level Panel Report, the Report of the Secretary-General, and the 
Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit is a consensus regarding the duty of 
states to their citizens and the “weak sovereignty defense” for their failure71 as well as the 
legitimacy of non-forcible intervention.  The international community acknowledges that 
states that are unwilling to act to protect their citizens do not have the same rights granted 
to them as a sovereign.  This perspective speaks of the greater image and values the 
international community holds.  More controversial is the resort to military intervention 
and the question of who bears this responsibility.  As Stahn argues, “responsibility to 
protect is thus in many way still a political catchword rather than a legal norm.”72  
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES 
CASE STUDY 1: RWANDA 
IGIHIRAHIRO:
1
 RWANDAN HISTORY 
The Republic of Rwanda passed through a handful of European colonial powers 
before finally obtaining its independence, but no one colonial power had such a definitive 
impact on the societal composition of the state of Rwandan as Belgium.  Belgium‟s direct 
involvement in the administration of the Rwandan colonial state brought about power, 
land, religious, economic and educational reforms that greatly favored the Tutsi 
populations.  As Prunier argues, the Belgian administration‟s rewriting and eschewing of 
Rwandan history created and deepened ethnic tensions which reverberated with the 
Rwandan social consciousness up to today.
2
   
Belgium emphasized religion as an organizing arena within the Rwandan state.
3
  
This “did not transcend social fractures, [but rather] reproduced them in many different 
dimensions and (albeit unwittingly) exaggerated their effects.”4  The November 1931 
removal of King Yuhi V Musinga on charges of adultery and bisexual liaisons, and his 
refusal to convert to Christianity and western dress stand as testament to the efforts of the 
Belgians to “modernize, simplify and ossify”  the Rwandan state. 5  Belgium‟s racial 
prejudices and the ability of the Tutsi population to gauge the needs of their colonizer 
produced what appeared to be a superior race and a Rwandan cultural mythology, one 
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that would be revised and reproduced in the 1957 Hutu Manifesto and in the subsequent 
rise of the Hutus to power two years later.
6
 
Under President Kayibanda, a majority ruled “democracy” was installed, 
characterized by a complete reversal of the status quo and the marginalization of Tutsis.  
Ethnic quotas which utilized “purification” campaigns in schools, universities, civil 
service jobs and private businesses, as well as massacres became a useful tool for the 
government and local officials, resulting in the creation of a large Tutsi refugee 
population (conservative figures place it at about 336,000) in neighboring Uganda, Zaire, 
Burundi, and Tanzania.
7
  
Taking advantage of tensions within Rwanda under the Kayibanda regime, 
Juvenal Habyarimana rose to power in 1979, maintaining many of the ethnic quota 
systems and establishing a “developmental dictatorship.”8  However, all would not 
remain peaceful in Rwanda.  As economic conditions deteriorated, especially due to 
Rwanda‟s growing dependency on income from coffee exports and the fall in prices for 
coffee on world markets, power struggles within Habyarimana‟s regime became public 
and Tutsi refugees attempted to bring to power Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema, two 
leading Tutsis, on October 1, 1990.
9
   
The Rwandan civil war drew the attention of the international community.  The 
French, under the guise of national interest, sent troops to aid the Habyarimana regime 
while Christian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and democratic sympathizers 
ignored the massacres and terror attacks that occurred from within the Rwandan 
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government.  These massacre campaigns were precursors to the genocide which occurred 
only a few years later. 
The Arusha Peace Agreements established a ceasefire, power sharing through the 
Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) which left President Juvenal 
Habyarimana in power (October 1992 and July 1993), a protocol on the repatriation of 
the refugees (June 1993), and the integration of the armed forces (August 1993).  The 
agreement was seen by Hutu extremists as a threat to their power.  By October 1992 the 
outline of a genocidal plan could be seen as “the protagonists in the future genocide had 
all found their places… the FAR [the Armed Forces of Rwanda] had its secret society, 
the extremist parties their militia, the secret service its killing squads.”10 
 
UMUGANDA:
11
 THE GENOCIDE 
Established by Security Council resolution 872 the United Nations Assistance 
Mission For Rwanda's (UNAMIR) was charged with the mandate to: 
assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; 
monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of 
an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization 
procedures; monitor the security situation during the final 
period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up 
to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the 
coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in 
conjunction with relief operations.
12
   
 
Equipped with 2,500 troops and no intelligence capabilities, the mission was 
inadequately equipped for the work ahead.  UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda on August 4, 
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1993, tasked with the maintenance of the ceasefire between the Rwandan Government in 
Kigali and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Northern Rwanda.  The rebel RPF, 
mostly composed of Tutsi refugees who had been persecuted for decades, had called for 
the return of Tutsis to the Rwandan home in late 1990.    
UNAMIR‟s mission was to usher in a new wave of power sharing among 
Rwandan Tutsis and Hutus, one that directly threatened the country‟s three decade old 
social structure.  Under the Arusha Peace agreement power sharing was to finally occur 
between Hutus and their Tutsi counterparts.  By January 1994, however, information had 
arrived to head officials within UNAMIR that Hutu extremists were attempting to derail 
the peace agreement.  According to the informant, Hutus had arrived on a plan to 
exterminate their Tutsi counterparts and target Belgian troops in order to induce western 
powers to remove their troops from the country.  
Lieutenant- General Romeo Dallaire wrote his supervisors in the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), then run by Kofi Annan, about the 
impending attacks and indicated that he was prepared to raid the weapons stockpiles.  
However, Lieutenant- General Dallaire was stopped by his supervisors when UNDPKO 
ordered him to stay within the bounds of his mission and avoid taking action.  Instead the 
UNDPKO opted to inform the Rwandan government of the plans.  With such a tepid 
response Hutu extremists gained confidence that their activities would go unopposed 
when finally carried out. 
 On April 6, 1994 at 8:30 am as the Rwandan presidential plane was descending 
into Kigali airport with President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyrien 
Ntaryamira of Burundi (both Hutus), it was shot down by an unidentified faction.  Soon 
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after the death of the president, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, a Hutu extremist, seized 
power.  By 9:15 am Interhamwe’s13 roadblocks were in place throughout the Rwandan 
capital of Kigali, and throughout the nation as the massacre of the Tutsi minority 
commenced.  The massacre of the Tutsis was conducted by local level Hutus wielding 
handheld tools such as machetes and masu (a handmade weapon). 
 Belgium and Guinean peacekeepers were quickly dispatched to protect the Acting 
Prime Minister of Rwanda Agathe Uwilingiyama.  As a moderate leaning politician, she 
was a huge target for Hutu extremists wishing to carry out their plans of extermination.  
According to some accounts, the Rwandan army surrounded and invaded the compound, 
taking the UN peacekeepers‟ weapons, and killed the Prime Minister.14  To fulfill the 
second part of their plan to sway western nations‟ political will within the state, ten 
Belgian peacekeepers were taken hostage and killed.  Among others targeted and killed 
during the first days of the genocide was Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the 
Constitutional Court, Charles Shamukiga, a civil rights activist, and Frederic 
Nzamurambaho, Minister of Agriculture and the Social Democratic Leader (PSD) 
leader.
15
 
With the loss of ten of their peacekeepers, Belgium sought a “dignified” way to 
walk away from the chaos engulfing Rwanda.  They contacted Western states in an 
attempt to coordinate a unified approach to their withdrawal in order to save face.  On 
April 9
th
 one thousand French and Belgian troops arrived to rescue their expatriates.  
While French and Belgian troops traveled across the country rescuing their citizens, 
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Tutsis who had taken refuge with these foreign protected groups were left for the Hutu 
extremists to wipe out.  As the Tutsi population fled for their lives, congregating at 
churches, stadiums, and official buildings, the army and national police stepped in and 
used more “sophisticated” measures to eradicate the Tutsi population congregated in 
these “safe centers.”  As these atrocities were taking place, Western powers questioned 
what was the right way of withdrawing “gracefully” from the state, how many of their 
troops were to be left behind and what was the mission for those remaining troops.  
When Rwandan human rights activist, Monique Mujawamaliya, attempted to 
formulate a stronger response from the US she was informed by some US officials that 
“the United States does not have friends, just interests and because no US interest could 
be served by intervening in the Rwandan case there was no interest in sacrificing 
American lives in that conflict.”16  The UN abandoned General Dallaire and the 
UNAMIR mission, ordering the withdrawal of 90 percent of the UN peacekeeping troops, 
leaving behind only 450 poorly equipped troops from developing countries. 
By the end of the first month the only outsider remaining in Rwanda was the 
International Red Cross, led by Philippe Gaillard, who drew media attention to attacks on 
Red Cross convoys, thus inducing the Rwandan government to give the organization safe 
passage throughout the country.
17
  The Red Cross‟ network of aid workers was the only 
source of information regarding the atrocities and the death count.  According to their 
estimates, by the first two weeks well over 100,000 Rwandans were killed.  It is 
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estimated that the Red Cross, as a result of its work during the crisis, was able to save 
65,000 lives.
18
 
Gregory “Gromo” Alex, a member of the UN Humanitarian Assistance team 
stationed in Kigali talked about the climate within Rwanda and how it constrained his 
ability to carry out his work.   
[We] started as early as we could in the morning not too 
early we tried to finish it as early in the afternoon as 
possible because that… by noon they had been drinking 
and were intoxicated and they had either killed peopled and 
wanted to kill more or hadn‟t killed and wanted to kill.  
Killing was like a drink that if you took one drink you 
wanted another and another you wanted to get more and 
more intoxicated.
19
 
 
By May 17, 1994 the Security Council finally changed course and authorized the addition 
of 5,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR.  However, few if any 
member states were willing to give to the operation.  On May 25
th
 President Bill Clinton 
reaffirmed America‟s intervention policy stressing the need for US interest as a central 
determinant of American action.  While the United States offered to provide logistical 
support and 50 armored personnel carriers, it took three months for them to finally arrive 
in Rwanda.  
July 1994, the Rwandan genocide ended, approximately 100 days after it started, 
with the triumph of the Rwanda Patriotic Front‟s against the Hutu extremists.  At the end 
of the ten week massacre some 800,000 Tutsis, over 80 percent of the overall Rwandan 
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Tutsi population, and an additional 100,000 Hutu sympathizers had been killed while the 
world watched.
20
  The Tutsis that survived were referred to as those not finished off yet. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
 With approximately 80 percent of the targeted Tutsi population massacred in 
roughly 100 days, the Rwandan genocide‟s efficiency was a jarring reality.  Orchestrated 
by the Hutu extremists, the genocide‟s successful execution was a testament to the 
failures of an international community unwilling to involve itself in the affairs of a 
country which served little geopolitical strategic interest.  Looking at the events leading 
up to the Rwandan genocide, we find an international community that was unreceptive to 
the genocide‟s early warning signs.  The position exhibited by the international 
community from the very beginning conditioned all levels of “activities” surrounding this 
situation.  As one of the most significant events to take place in the immediate wake of 
the Cold War‟s end, it represented the international community‟s unwillingness to act 
because it served no direct state interest and also lacked precedent regarding genocide 
prevention/ humanitarian intervention to serve the common good.   
The findings of the Report of the Independent Inquiry on the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda were that the United Nations and its member states lacked political will, 
resources and direction.  From the beginning, the UNAMIR was doomed to failure as its 
creation lacked the right intentions and inefficiencies.  For one thing the United Nations 
via the Secretary General, Security Council, DPKO and other organs of the United 
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Nations, and the member states set the UNAMIR mission and the Rwandan population up 
for failure.   
The international community failed to take into account the country‟s history with 
ethnically motivated massacres.  Significant ethnically based discrimination, violence and 
propaganda were present in the early 90s.  The early warning signs should have been seen 
by UN officials, DPKO officials, and other parties involved in establishing UNAMIR‟s 
objectives, scope and goals.  This failure is significant as it indicated a failure to 
understand the dominant social structures of the state and ignored the reality on the 
ground.  Further, the international community failed to provide the reconnaissance 
mission which was sent to Rwanda to establish the Neutral International Force (NIF) with 
a report submitted by the Special Rapport of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. 
Waly Bacre Ndiaye.   The report specifically pointed out the likelihood that genocide was 
taking place and as such should have drawn the attention of the Secretary General, 
Security Council, signatories to the Genocide Convention, and UN organs involved in the 
country.  Yet the report was largely ignored and the information failed to inform the 
creation/formation and work of UNAMIR.  Furthermore, the findings resulting from Mr. 
Ndiaye‟s visit to Rwanda from April 8-17, 1993 could have allowed Brigadier-General 
Romeo A. Dallaire‟s reconnaissance mission to better gauge the situation on the ground 
and ask for the appropriate number of troops.  It would have allowed the UNAMIR, once 
established in Rwanda, to better assess their operations and take appropriate actions when 
extremist activities threatened the mission‟s goals.  As the report argues, “the planning 
process failed to take into account remaining serious tensions which had not been solved 
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in the agreement between the parties.”21  The failure to communicate important 
information regarding the human rights situation to Dallaire‟s mission prohibited 
UNAMIR from addressing the full scope of the Rwandan conflict and framing 
developments within the country accordingly. 
Additionally, once reliable information was made available to the UN 
peacekeepers, the international community treated such information with disinterest.  
Romeo Dallaire‟s cable to the DPKO illustrates the wealth of information available to the 
United Nations and international community when it comes to active engagement in 
genocide prevention.  In this case information was not shared with high level officials 
who were better able to gauge the totality of the situation and/or take effective action to 
halt the violence.  Dallaire‟s failure to include the Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping and Political Affairs in his cable greatly limited his audience and the 
support he strongly needed.  Further, the DPKO‟s refusal to bring the deteriorating 
situation to the attention of the Secretary General and Security Council, and its decision 
to opt to respond so tepidly paved the way for Hutu extremist actions.  By failing to take 
real action and share information with officials able to do something, the international 
community limited its options.  Interestingly enough, DPKO‟s claims that actions taken 
by Dallaire‟s forces were in violation of the rules of engagement were faulty because 
Dallaire‟s Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR drafted on November 23, 1993 never 
elicited a response from Peacekeeping Operations officials. 
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In many respects what is arguably the international community‟s failure in the 
lead-up to and throughout the Rwandan genocide was very consistent with attitudes at the 
time.  The truth is that there was a general interest in avoiding situations that would have 
strained resources, and committed troops and finances to a situation which did not 
provide an easy answer.  Because a significant number of states viewed UNAMIR as a 
symbolic gesture they conditioned the mission‟s funding and continued support on its 
immediate success.  As a result they communicated to officials within the UN body what 
types of information was welcomed.  By threatening to defund and eliminate missions 
that were not immediately successful or which evolved in ways inconsistent with member 
states‟ demands, they narrowly defined peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and forced 
officials directly involved with the Rwandan situation to edit information which 
threatened the continued livelihood of UNAMIR.  Further, in the absence of any prior 
precedent or norm regarding human rights or genocide prevention that might propel the 
international community into action for the common good, Rwanda was doomed. 
Taking a look at the planning process for UNAMIR we constantly encounter 
problems regarding the international community‟s position.  First there were divergent 
opinions on the number of troops needed for the mission, with the Arusha delegation 
requesting a troop size of 4,260, and the Secretary General identifying a troop force of 
2,548.
22
  The international inquiry report indicates that throughout the planning process 
states expressed an interest in reducing the troop force required.  As the report argues:  
This picture of the political commitment at the time was 
probably correct: the United States delegation had 
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suggested to the United Nations that a symbolic presence of 
100 be sent to Rwanda.  Even France, which had pushed 
for a United Nations presence in Rwanda, felt that 1,000 
would suffice.
23
  
 
The bartering among member states about the troop size for the UNAMIR mission 
represented both a naive oversimplification of the situation in Rwanda and a general lack 
of political will to expend resources.   
As the March 14, 1994 report by the Security Council “Improving the Capacity of 
the United Nations for Peacekeeping” indicated, there was a significant growth in 
demands for UN peacekeeping operations which were increasingly constrained by the 
decreasing financial and moral support to carry out these types of missions.   
The findings of the Independent Inquiry into of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
show that UNAMIR was sidelined by the evacuation practices of France, Belgium, the 
United States and Italy,
24
  that it suffered from significant infighting among contributing 
member states,
25
 and that the disbanding and evacuation of the police command 
significantly constrained the strength of the troops already on the ground from responding 
as a unified front.  
The international community‟s rhetoric toward the Arusha delegation and 
UNAMIR mission emphasized withdrawal and minimal engagement.  This rhetoric 
conditioned how information was distributed throughout the UN bodies and how 
information was shared from UNAMIR reports, and also limited the inclusion of all 
                                                 
23
 United Nations Security Council. Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council. “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the 
United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.” Supp. 1257.   (S/1999/1257).  Official Record. 
New York, 1999, pp. 32. 
24
 Ibid, pp. 36. 
25
 This was exemplified in the refusal of Bangladeshi peacekeeping troops to allow Belgian colleagues into 
Amahoro Stadium, Ibid, pp. 36. 
   
45 
possible options available to respond to the heightened situation.  As the report correctly 
argues: 
the instinctive reaction within the Secretariat seems to have 
been to question the feasibility of an effective United 
Nations response, rather than to actively investigate the 
possibility of strengthening the operation to deal with the 
new challenges on the ground.
26
 
 
The death of 800,000 Tutsis and 200,000 sympathizers was truly a moral failure 
for the international community.  Fifteen years later we are able to see where constructive 
engagement could have taken place.   We are also able to praise a number of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and individuals for saving thousands of lives and 
staying behind as the world stepped back and watched.  The Rwandan genocide stands as 
a testament to the refusal to address problems from the outset of tense situations, to 
bureaucratic obstructions, poor allocation or use of resources, a lack of political will and 
the repercussions of a non-existent response.  As a result of the international 
community‟s failure to respond to the Rwanda crisis violence spread to Burundi, Zaire, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  As Gerard Prunier argues, the tensions that 
sprang from the Rwandan conflict boiled over and had debilitating effects throughout the 
sub-Saharan region.
27
  The Rwandan genocide erased the notion that a “symbolic” act is 
better than nothing.  As member states stressed their own individual interest over the 
common good, they eroded the integrity of their work and wasted resources. 
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CASE STUDY 2: BOSNIA 
THE HISTORY OF THE FORMER FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
  
Born of different national identities and experiences with both the Hapsburg and 
Ottoman Empires, the six republics and two autonomous provinces which constituted the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were an unlikely and awkward constellation of states.  
With the end of the Second World War the republics of Yugoslavia were united under the 
decisive leadership of Josep Broz Tito.  Under the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” Tito 
centralized government and impeded the nationalist tendencies of the various republics 
until his death in 1980.  With “blood soaked hands” Tito reined in ancient ethnic 
tensions.
28
  However, with his death the Republics of Yugoslavia was tossed into 
upheaval as a lack of forward planning by the enigmatic leader gave way to nationalistic 
tendencies and economic disintegration.   
As Leslie Benson argues, the Yugoslav project under Tito‟s leadership was able 
to persist because Western economic aid which utilized Yugoslavia‟s geopolitical 
position to counter the threat of the Soviet bloc allowed Yugoslavs to live well beyond 
their means.  In reality, Benson argues that Tito‟s never fully dealt with the reality of 
Yugoslav socialist democracy because: 1) “„market socialism‟ never existed, and 2) 
„Direct Democracy‟ was always a slogan.”29  Moreover, an incredible debt was amassed 
during Tito‟s rule identified at US$20.5 billion by 1983, causing the average standard of 
living to drop by 30 percent, consumer prices to drop by 36 percent annually and average 
incomes to drop by two thirds.
30
  With the disintegration of the USSR and the fall of the 
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Berlin Wall, the Yugoslav Republics were left isolated with a huge debt as western aid 
dwindled because their geopolitical importance diminished.   
A decade after Tito‟s death a younger generation of leaders with national ties 
started coming to power.  In place of Tito‟s leadership the eight man state presidency, 
installed in 1979, which rotated power among the various republics, was utilized by each 
president to further the overall economic interest of his respective state.  The tension 
inherent in such a system was not felt until the full collapse of the Soviet state.  In the 
wake of the death of Tito the republics of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo became a hotbed of conflict over land, resources and power.   
As the first real sign of the intent of the Serbian people to finally re-establish their 
ancestral homeland, a 1986 draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts charged that a conspiracy against Serbian nationalism by the Yugoslav leadership 
had divided Serbia into three nations for the good of the Federation, and that genocide 
was being committed by Kosovo against the Serbs within the territory.
31
 
Under a banner of ethnic unity Slobodan Milosevic heard the voices of the 
Serbian people and tried to unify Serbians throughout the various Yugoslav republics, 
calling upon the ancient efforts of their ancestors.  According to Benson, “the Serbs were 
backwoods men, easy meat for nationalist demagogues like Radovan Karadzic and 
Milosevic, who milked the ideology of the peasant folks, offering them paternalistic 
reassurance that they had not been forgotten.”32  His attempts to fulfill Serbian unity 
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caused great tensions among the Former Yugoslav republics as one by one Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina took steps toward independence.   
 
THE RISE OF THE BOSNIAN STATE 
The disintegration of the Federation of Republics of Yugoslavia was a slow but 
catastrophic event as Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina would break away.    
On October 15, 1991 the Bosnian Republican Assembly proclaimed the sovereignty of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Worry arose as Muslim nationalism caused great unease to the 
Bosnian Serbian minority.  The catalyst for the Bosnian- Serbian conflict was the March 
1, 1992 killing of a father of the groom by a Muslim man.  Immediately Bosnian Serbs 
erected barricades.  Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs declared: “I warn 
you, you‟ll drag Bosnia down to hell.  You Muslims aren‟t ready for war- you could face 
extinction.” 33 
The international community faced great difficulty in crafting an effective plan to 
stem the violence and save the lives of countless people.  Two weeks after the outbreak 
of violence, the European Community (EC) held a conference in Lisbon suggesting the 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten self- regulating provinces along ethnic lines.  
The plan was immediately rejected by Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic.   Upon his 
return from the meeting, President Alija Izetbegovic was captured and held by the 
Yugoslav Federal Army until the United Nations was able to broker an exchange for 
Yugoslav Federal Army Commander, Milutin Kukanjac. 
                                                 
33
 The Death of Yugoslavia. DVD. Directed by Nicholas Fraser. Brian Lapping Associates for British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1995. 
   
49 
In the wake of the disintegration of the Yugoslav states, Serbia and Croatia 
secretly agreed to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines, with no consideration 
of the Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslim populations.  The land grab by both Croatia and Serbia 
preyed on the multiethnic Bosnian population and its military weakness.  On March 27
th
 
Bosnian Serbs declared their own independent republic, Republika Srpska.  Serbia‟s 
President Milosevic funneled Serbian troops and Yugoslav Federal army troops into 
Bosnian Serb military forces and used them as proxies.  According to Borisav Jovic, 
President of the Yugoslav State Council and Special Advisor to Milosevic, the two 
provided Bosnian Serbian 50- 80,000 troops, and strategic financial and military 
assistance.
 34
   The Serbian troops took over land along the Serbian border and those 
territories which held large Serbian populations.  As in their campaigns against Slovenia 
and Croatia, Serbia president Slobodan Milosevic united Serbs in the name of an ethnic 
banner, resulting in the Bosnian Serbs gaining 70 percent territory the height of the 
conflict.  A few months later Croats in western Herzegovina proclaimed the state of 
Herceg-Bosna.   
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic met with Karadzic to find a solution to the 
problem.  Izetbegovic left the Bosnian Serbs in their territories due to his army‟s inability 
to suppress the uprising.  Bosnia was reduced to the Sarajevo- Tuzla- Travnik triangle in 
central Bosnia and saw the flight of 1.5 million Bosnians, the creation of detention 
camps, killing centers, mass rapes, torture, and destruction of Islamic cultural artifacts.
35
  
In April 1992, General Assembly resolution 46/ 237 admitted the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
republic into the United Nations.  By May the United Nations took steps to extend the 
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mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), originally established in 
Croatia to “ensure demilitarization of designated areas… to support the delivery of 
humanitarian relief, [and] monitor no fly zones [and] safe areas."
36
 
 
THE BOSNIAN GENOCIDE 
Amid western reluctance thousands of Muslims sought refuge in Srebrenica, a 
province southeast of the Bosnian Capital of Sarajevo.  Bosnian Serbs tried to starve their 
enemies and force them into submission by constant bombing.  While western powers 
were reluctant to directly intervene in the conflict, bodies within the United Nations tried 
to address the massacres being carried out in Muslim- dominated communities and in 
Srebrenica more specifically.  Venezuelan Diego Arria, chair of the UN Non-Aligned 
Bloc, urged some action arguing that “when you see the… massacres that are occurring at 
such… magnitude and the precedent that this sets for the rest of the world…eh… our 
conscience is of grave moral authority to talk about these matters.”37 
Resolution 819 identified Srebrenica as a safe area, which obliged the UN to deter 
attacks on the Muslim town.  As a stipulation for his acceptance of the resolution, 
Bosnian Serb Commander Ratko Mladic required the United Nations to persuade the 
Muslims to surrender their weapons, a condition the Bosnian Army accepted upon the 
urging of General Philippe Morillon, Commander of the United Nations Forces in 
Bosnia, and the promise of Canadian troops.  “But since the UN had no means to defend 
or supply them, they were anything but safe, and the shepherding of Muslims into these 
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enclaves did the work of ethnic cleansing for the Serbs, putting them all tidily into a 
demilitarized limbo for later mopping up.”38  Added to the list of safe areas were 
Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Bihac. 
Two attempts at peace made by Lord Carrington and Lord Owen of Britain failed 
because western countries viewed the conflicts in the Balkans as irresolvable.  Reflecting 
this sentiment, Lord Owen warned Bosnians: “don‟t… don‟t… don‟t… live under this 
dream that the west is going to come in and sort this problem out don‟t dream dreams.”39 
Two United States administrations stood by as the slaughter in Bosnia went on.  Both US 
Secretary of State James Baker (May1992) and Warren Christopher (January 1994) 
argued that the United States was in no condition to get involved in the Bosnian problem 
because they could not police the world. 
Several months later the Vance- Owen plan attempted to negotiate peace by 
proposing that Bosnia‟s administration be shared among Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks 
through the establishment of ten self governing provinces.  The plan was rejected by the 
Bosnian Serb Assembly by a majority vote of five to one, upon Mladic‟s description of 
the extent of land loss and the unfavorable terms of the plan for the Serbian population if 
it was accepted.   
By June 1995 Bosnian commanders had found little value in Srebrenica as they 
saw a general reluctance by the international community to fulfill their promise to fully 
commit to the UN safe zone.  In retaliation for Muslims‟ attack on a Serbian village, 
Serbs decided to fight back and take hold of Srebrenica.  In the midst of the attacks 
thousands of Bosnian Muslims ran into the fields where Bosnian Serb soldiers were 
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waiting for them.  By the 12
th
 of July 1995 well over 25,000 Muslims had run to the UN 
base in Srebrenica.
40
  As Muslim women, children and elderly were being caravanned out 
of the area, well over 8,000 Muslim men were executed.  Dr. Ilijav Pilav, a Srebrenica 
citizen, recalled that “life in Srebrenica was hell but what we went through on that 
journey that was the ninth circle of hell.”41  The international community stood by as 
these attacks were carried out.  Aid did not arrive to the desperate Bosniaks until August 
1995 when NATO finally launched airstrikes in response to the repeated bombing of 
Sarajevo‟s marketplace. 
A ceasefire was viewed as unfavorable to the Bosnian Serbs but was achieved 
upon the influence of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle, the Serbian Orthodox leader who 
urged the adoption of the agreement.
42
  The Contact Group, composed of the United 
States, Britain, Russia, France and Germany, tried to induce Serbians to sign a peace 
agreement and establish land sharing between the Muslim-Croat Federation and Serbians 
by giving each 51 percent and 49 percent respectfully.  By October 1995 a ceasefire had 
been agreed to by all parties and in late October peace talks took place in Wright-
Patterson US airbase in Ohio.  The Dayton Peace Accord was formally signed on 
November 21, 1995. The Dayton Agreements, signed on December 14, 1995 lifted the 
arms embargo and signaled the end of the Bosnian conflict. 
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ASSESSMENT 
The disintegration of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia was a slow and catastrophic 
event.  As the states of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Slovenia and the independent provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo evolved into a hotbed 
of conflict in the 1990s, the international community again played witness to genocide.  
As Yugoslavia disintegrated, with deaths resulting from policies of ethnic cleansing and 
an episode of genocide, the violence exhibited by all sides of the conflict attracted major 
actors on the international stage and once again tested their commitment to the Genocide 
Convention.   
The massacres of Bosnian males in July 1995 at the United Nations safe area of 
Srebrenica, one of six United Nations designated safe areas, was the largest mass murder 
to take place in Europe since the Holocaust.
43
  The international community played an 
active role in the conflict, expending time and resources to try to bring an end to the 
conflict and restore peace to the region.  But, failures in planning and wavering 
commitment spelled doom for thousands.  The bodies of approximately 8,000 male 
Bosniaks littered the fields surrounding Srebrenica yet again signaled a major failure for 
the international community.  
The Bosnian conflict may have succeeded in drawing greater aid and support 
from a full spectrum of the international community, as compared to the Rwandan crisis, 
yet the severity of the conflict greatly tested the international community‟s resolve.  This 
time a lack of precedence and resolve undermined the work of UNPROFOR.  As early 
warning signs were ignored and aggressors underestimated the response mechanisms 
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meant to deter the violence UNPROFOR was encumbered by a faulty chain of command 
and administrative inefficiencies and formalities. 
As nationalism revived in the wake of Tito‟s death, the disintegration of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia erupted into a mobile, ethnically motivated, dirty war.  
Burned villages, ethnic cleansing, rape, executions, forced relocations, bombings, and 
other tactics were used by all sides in order to lay claim to land or power.  Activities of 
this nature were increasingly a common part of the Bosnian-Serb-Croat conflict.  As the 
November 1999 report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
53/35 points out, well over 1 million people were displaced and tens of thousands died in 
the wake of Serbian conquest.
44
   
The violence attracted the attention of the European Community (EC), United 
Nations (UN), Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC).  Such wide spread knowledge of the commonality of violence in Bosnia drove the 
international community to commit air support, a UN troop size of 30,000, and hold a 
number of conferences to broker peace.  Additionally, the international community 
dabbled with the creation of safe zones meant to provide shelter for Bosnian Muslims and 
assisted in the distribution of humanitarian aid.  But, the international community balked 
as differing opinions on the appropriate course of action failed to give clarity to the work 
of UNPROFOR.  The Commander of UNPROFOR noted that there was “a fantastic gap 
                                                 
44
 United Nations General Assembly, 54
th
 Session.  Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General 
Assembly resolution 53/35. “The Fall of Srebrenica.” Supp. 549 (A/54/549). Official Record. New York, 
1999, pp. 10. 
   
55 
between these resolutions, the will to execute these resolutions, and the means available 
to commanders in the field.”45  As Yashushi Akashi argued: 
with a consensus absent in the Council, lacking strategy, 
and burdened by an unclear mandate, UNPROFOR was 
forced to chart its own course… thus choos[ing] to pursue a 
policy of relatively passive enforcement.
46
 
 
As UNPROFOR opted to adopt a passive enforcement policy in order to meet the 
most minimal requirements of the Security Council members, it was doomed for failure.  
The Bosnian case makes clear that there was a significant gap between the rhetoric which 
was coursing through the United Nations and its member states and its application on the 
ground.   
The international community‟s attempts to broker peace among the warring 
parties were greatly undermined by their propensity to appease aggressors.  The clearest 
example of this failure was in their policies regarding the UN safe zones.  By catering to 
the Serbian‟s demands for the disarmament of the population in order to allow for the 
establishment of the UN safe zones and the granting of administrative control of these 
zones to Serbs, they carelessly placed a whole population in a very vulnerable situation.  
The international community continued a policy of appeasement as Serbians grew more 
and more aggressive and unwilling to compromise.  The Serbian‟s growing 
confrontational stance and rebellious nature should have been good warning signs of the 
need to bulk up protection of UN safe zones.   
                                                 
45
 United Nations General Assembly, 54
th
 Session.  Report of the Secretary General pursuant to General 
Assembly resolution 53/35. “The Fall of Srebrenica.” Supp. 549 (A/54/549). Official Record. New York, 
1999, pp. 32. 
46
 Ibid, pp. 16. 
   
56 
The Secretary General‟s report argues that Serbian troops were well equipped 
compared to their UN counterparts who suffered from a lack of resources, technology and 
equipment.  Serbia‟s aggressive position in Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica during July 
6-11 went unaddressed or punished by NATO or UN forces.  The reality of the bloody 
massacres, arms embargo and the demilitarization of the Srebrenica safe area highlight 
the fact that the conditions which greatly limited the ability of Bosniaks to protect and 
defend themselves should have been factored in as the UN passively handed over the 
Srebrenica enclave.   
According to the report Serbs had between 1-2,000 soldiers, tanks, armored 
vehicles, mortar and artillery.
47
  Further, they kept the Srebrenica safe zone hostage for 
three months prior to the genocide, and restricted the passage of supplies and equipment.  
In the immediate lead- up to the genocide Serbs fired directly at UN forces.  Further, as 
the Serbian troops were within kilometers of the enclave, the UN troops chose to 
negotiate instead of defend.  Their practices show a severe reluctance to step back and 
fully acknowledge the reality on the ground. 
As a result of spats among UN and NATO personnel over control of the NATO 
air force, an unclear chain of procedures emerged that resulted in a number of Dutchbat‟s 
(the battalion in charge of protecting the Srebrenica safe zone) request in the lead- up to 
the genocide going unnoticed.  The most glaring failure was experienced as a result of a 
three hour delay between the registering and processing of the request of Dutchbat three 
for air support by Force Command and NATO Liaison Officers.  This failure resulted in 
greater delays in assistance as air support was forced to return to base for refueling.  On 
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various occasion on the morning of July 11
th
 Dutchbat‟s request did not go on record and 
did not reach the leadership in Zagreb and Sarajevo.  Another significant failure was the 
lack of information sharing with the leadership of the United Nations Peace Force 
(UNPF) and other key officials.   Bodies within the United Nations were given inaccurate 
and misleading information.   
As a result of failures committed in the early days of the genocide, an appropriate 
response was greatly limited.  By appeasing Serbian aggressors, failing to acknowledge 
the bloody nature of the conflict, clearly defining the work of UNPROFOR, and 
establishing clear and effective procedures, an appropriate response was out of the 
question.  Further, the severest failure by the international community was their blind 
handover of Srebrenica without ensuring the complete protection of inhabitants or their 
transfer to other safe zones.  They failed to ensure the safety of those entrusted to their 
care and their refusal to allow Bosniaks to arm in self defense ensured their death. 
The Bosnian genocide drew the attention of the international community as they 
established a UN peacekeeping force of 30,000 troops, the creation of safe zones and 
continued attempts toward a peace agreement.  The extent to which the international 
community was willing to try to establish a number of safe areas in the midst of the war 
highlights the growing interest of the community in protecting a people greatly battered. 
Yet their work was plagued with a lack of direction, administrative inefficiency and lack 
of international resolve.  As the largest genocide to occur on the European continent since 
the Holocaust it was a startlingly call to our conscience.  The massacre of approximately 
8,000 Bosnian Muslim military age males requires us to visit the engagement of war 
along ethnic lines and re-evaluate dominant attitudes and practices. 
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 CASE STUDY 3: DARFUR 
The Darfur case is not officially considered genocide because the genocidal intent has 
not been present within the central Sudanese government and the violence has not been 
directed to the legally defined protected groups.  However, it does serve as an exemplar 
case.  Darfur‟s lack of definitional cohesion within the legally accepted framework does 
not mean that it does not represent a systemic use of violence against a population that 
sees and is seen within its own society as different or “other.”  It took a significant toll on 
the targeted populations and had spillover costs in the form of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) and the presence of a large refugee population in neighboring Chad.  
More importantly the backdrop of a North-South conflict that has plagued Sudan since its 
independence and the January 2011 referendum which has granted the oil rich south the 
right to secede from Khartoum has aggravated the situation.  Its inclusion is further 
supported by the fact that the United Nations, the African Union, the United States, and 
the public agree on its relevance.   
 
THE HISTORY OF TWO SUDAN 
Sudan is described as a country of two halves.  Like many British colonies, Sudan 
exemplifies the repercussions of colonial practices which reinvented identity.  According 
to Mahmood Mamdani, “Arabism” within Sudanese society has taken on a varied 
significance.
48
  Arabism has evolved to encompass a cultural movement, a linguistically 
useful organizing tool as well as a strategic political mechanism.  Julie Flint argues that 
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identity with in Sudan has been of a transitory nature, highly dependent on the context.
49
  
However, even within this reality the North and the Khartoum government have played 
an instrumental role in how Sudanese identity has translated into significant structural 
realities.  Northern Sudan has viewed Arabism as a source of pride and status, evolving it 
to signify an avenue for power and international allegiance.  In essence as Khartoum has 
tried to remake Sudanese society and shake off years of discontent, its „arabization‟ of 
Sudan through policies enacted has escalated tensions.   
The Khartoum government has long been disconnected from its people.  It has 
been reluctant or unable to overcome economic and political injustice.  As Douglas H. 
Johnson argues, Sudan experienced a decline in its agricultural output and annual growth 
rate of exports and experienced a rise in its annual balance of payments during the 
1980s.
50
  Additionally, the eventual failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement which had 
established peace between the North and the South and the dismissal of the Regional 
Assemblies which distributed power among the various regions, limited the autonomy of 
the peripheral regions educational and economic planning.  Further, economic disparities 
as a result of the government‟s unequal distribution of wealth and resources and the 
combined effects of the previously mentioned conditions brewed discontent among the 
populace.  However, the Sudanese government opted for “appeals to Islam and Pan-
Arabism… used by parties of the centre to overcome the discontent of marginality.”51    
 Khartoum‟s 1989 decision to redefine Sudanese society as a pure Arab/ Islamic 
society has had a disastrous effect.  By failing to construct a national identity that 
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reconciles the differences between the racial and religious identities of its people and 
address the inequalities and injustices that have bred displeasure, it has pushed the 
country into a bloody battle.  Sudan‟s push toward an Arab/Islamic Sudanese identity 
only fuels already existing disdain at the economic disparities between the North and the 
greatly marginalized rest of the country.  It has utilized identity to circumvent real 
leadership and problem solving.   
In May 2000, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan 
published by the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel group, was distributed 
throughout the country.
52
  The book documented how individuals originating from three 
northern tribes that represented only 5.4 percent of the country‟s overall populations 
controlled a significant distribution of political and economic power.
53
  It highlighted the 
tribes‟ control over the presidency, and dominance “in the police and military hierarchy, 
the judiciary, provincial administrations, banks and developmental schemes.”54 
 
THE VIOLENCE  
 Amidst the North- South bloody war and division within the Khartoum 
government, rebellion spread throughout Darfur, the western region of Sudan.  Darfuri 
rebels went public on February of 2003 seeking the implementation of development 
programs and greater equality and recognition.  “On March of 2003, the rebels seized the 
garrison town of Tine on the Chad border and captured huge stocks of arms and 
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equipment.”55  In response the Khartoum government took a strict stance with the rebels 
as they felt the pressure to present a strong front vis-a-vis the already raging conflict with 
the South.  In what they argue was a counterinsurgency campaign the government 
utilized the Janjaweed, an Arab militia composed of looters on horseback, to conduct a 
scorched earth campaign on hundreds of Darfur villages in an attempt to weed out the 
rebels.  The Sudanese government coordinated the rearmament reinforcement, and use of 
air support for the Janjaweed in exchange for their services.
56
  As a cheap method of 
counterinsurgency the group was granted immunity for their raids, murder, and rape of 
thousands of women.   
By early April a joint partnership among the military forces and Janjaweed 
attempted to put down the rebellion and in the process targeted villages they believed 
supported some of the rebel forces.  In response, 317 rebels in thirteen vehicles drove off 
to the Kutum air base and destroyed seven military planes, killed 70 military personnel 
and acquired a stock pile of weapons.
57
   
Viewing the unraveling conflict and the tenacity of the rebellion, the government 
stuck to its position instead of trying to meet the developmental needs of the region.  
They armed Arabs in the region as a counter measure yet quickly lost control of the 
populace as greed pushed many to target Fur and Masalit tribes.  In a communication 
with the Western Area Commander, Musa Hilal, a Janjaweed militia leader, reiterated 
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that “you are informed that directives have been issued … to change the demography of 
Darfur and empty it of African tribes.”58   
In March 2004 a series of massacres were carried out as Janjaweed, armed with 
lists, rounded up hundreds of “rebels” from their homes.59  According to Flint and de 
Waal, “the UN estimated that between 700 and 2,000 villages were totally or partially 
destroyed.”60   As a result of the attacks by the government- supported militia the death 
toll of a number of nomadic African tribes in the Darfur region was approximated at 
300,000 with more than 3 million made homeless, and untold number of rapes.
61
  As Flint 
and De Waal argue, “in the subsequent debate over whether the war in Darfur constituted 
genocide or not … one thing is certain: the people who decided to use ethnic militias as a 
counter-insurgency force knew exactly what it would mean.”62 
 While information regarding the growing violence against nomadic African tribes 
in the Darfur region of Sudan was brought to the attention of the international community 
as early as late 2003- early 2004, a number of key officials ignored the conflict in favor 
of the North-South peace process which was to put an end to the bloody civil war.  Much 
like what was seen in Rwanda and Bosnia before, those with the information about the 
ensuing violence failed to share this information with key officials early in the conflict.  
Such information failed to arrive to the ears of civil society and key officials until a 
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frustrated UN official went live on the BBC denouncing the violence and the lack of 
international attention.
63
   
 In his address during the 10
th
 anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, then 
Secretary-General Kofi-Annan (1997- 2006) noted the urgency of the Darfur conflict and 
pressed for action.  An African Union troop contingent sent in 2004 in an attempt to 
broker a peace agreement lacked resources and international support.  NATO would 
participate in the training and transporting of African Union troops during 2004-2007 in 
an attempt to strengthen the AU‟s peacekeeping operations capacity.  Four Security 
Council resolutions discussing the Darfur conflict passed by the Security Council during 
2004 were accompanied by no real action to halt the violence.  According to Frontline, 
the international community‟s unwillingness to act assertively resulted in 6,000 new 
deaths for each month the conflict went unchecked.
64
  Seven UN resolutions were passed 
in 2005, and an additional eight in 2006 before the international community finally 
mobilized. 
In 2007, the Security Council finally passed resolution 1706 with a vote of 12:0:3.  
The resolution which called for UN troops to be sent to Sudan to address the conflict was 
weakened by the inclusion of a clause which made the troops‟ presence dependent on the 
approval of the Sudanese government, a consent which was never given.  However, this 
missed opportunity did not last for long as civil society mobilized in large anti-genocide 
demonstrations and began the “Genocide Olympics” campaign.65  They pressured their 
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respective governments to address the Darfur crisis.  In July 2007 Security Council 
Resolution 468 establishing a UN peacekeeping troop of 26,000 was finally approved. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
 The response to the Darfur conflict has been plagued by significant failures.  
Political bargaining resulted in a delayed response from the international community.  
The 2007 resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping presence in Sudan, three years after 
the conflict began was a meager response and a disappointment to many.  Ten years after 
the Rwandan genocide, the international community repeated its faulty policies and let 
civilian- targeted violence go unchecked.  Nevertheless, while still an imperfect example 
of humanitarian intervention, practices that have arisen in the immediate aftermath of the 
violence follow a more calculated response to states obligations to prevent genocide and 
other mass atrocities.  
 The initial failure of the international community was a result of its emphasis on 
the North-South conflict and its desperate attempts to bring about peace.  The 
international community failed to take into account that the same conditions that bred 
discontent in the south were also present throughout the country.  Further, the habitation 
of violence in the Sudanese conflict was not taken into account during its assessment of 
the conflict.   
 When information regarding the growing violence in the Darfur region of Sudan 
was brought to the attention of the international community, it went largely unaddressed.  
Protected by the international community‟s failure to respond as a result of sovereignty 
concerns, the Sudanese government was able to excuse the violence as a normal 
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byproduct of events in a developing country.  In fact the Sudanese government 
manipulated information to downplay the violence within the region and stall any 
progress.   
 While then United Nations Secretary- General Kofi Annan strongly advocated 
action by member states, the conflict was placed on the backburner.  Further, information 
which was shared and made public did not elicit a response as a result of Sudan‟s 
strategic value to the Chinese government.  The establishment of a fact- finding 
commission did not present the situation as a severe situation.  While it succeeded in 
reporting individuals linked to the violence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
leading to the indictments of a number of individuals they did not press the international 
community to get involved in halting the violence.  With the involvement of NATO and 
the EU early on, the African Union troops were able to receive training but were still 
inadequately equipped for the burden of halting the violence.  
It was not until civil society was made aware of the situation that sufficient 
pressure was placed on leading governments to take a more forceful stance with the 
Sudanese government.  As the crucial catalyst for action due to their use of anti- genocide 
demonstrations, international campaigns, the dissemination of information and lobbying 
activities, civil society mobilized in significant ways to elicit states‟ action.  The pressure 
placed on governments by civil society helped force the hand of governments to act. 
 Additionally, the establishment of a hybrid United Nations- African Union 
peacekeeping operation was a weak response as they came only after the death of 
thousands and the reduction of violence within the region.  However, with 22,061 
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personnel and a budget of $1,808,127,500,
66
 it is one of the largest funded operations for 
2010-2011.  Through the work of the peacekeeping operations violence in the region has 
been greatly reduced and a draft peace document was drawn up in September 2010.
67
  
However, the UNAMID mission still faces many challenges in its path toward 
establishing a lasting peace in Sudan.  
 While the death of 300,000 people, the displacement of millions, and the rape of 
an untold number of women is a shocking reality that offends our moral sensibility, 
recent activities are likely to be the first steps toward true prevention.  What the Darfur 
case tells us is that change is possible, yet the international community has only been able 
to make progress in response to its glaring failures.  It still continues to suffer greatly 
from inactivity and political bargaining.  The indictment of key officials like President 
Omar al-Bashir, Minister of State for the Interior Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed militia 
leader Ali Kushayb as well as the establishment of a peacekeeping operation which has 
taken a hybrid approach with considerable assistance from NATO are all significant and 
promising practices.   
 
CASE STUDY CONCLUSION 
Missed opportunities can be found cutting across the case studies, speaking to 
critical aspects of peacekeeping and genocide prevention.  The Rwandan case study, for 
example, illustrates how dominant political perspectives and a lack of commitment by 
major actors hinder the potential success of all levels of genocide prevention.  Srebrenica 
falls along the same lines of discussion as the emerging and poorly formulated practices 
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regarding UN Safe Zones and disarmament practices hindered peace.  Moreover, the 
Srebrenica incident highlights the failure of appeasement policies toward aggressors as a 
significant threat to the international community‟s responsibility for peace and security.   
The Darfur conflict also echoes some of the lessons learned in Srebrenica as 
appeasement of the Sudanese government during the conflict resulted in a significantly 
delayed response from the international community.  Darfur highlights the gaps between 
international rhetoric and the international community‟s propensity toward inactivity.  
However the strongest lesson that can be drawn from the Darfur conflict is the important 
role civil society can have in overcoming some of the international community‟s 
bureaucratic and political inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, communication and information sharing greatly hampered prospects 
for success in both Rwanda and Bosnia, pointing to the importance of clear channels of 
communication and command.  In all three cases international actors failed to integrate 
past history with ethnically based violence, and civil war to UN peacekeeping missions 
and intervention.  And key developments and genocidal plans were often ignored or 
ineffectively addressed.  For all of the case studies, political will hampered some if not all 
levels of genocide prevention.  
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CHAPTER 4: GENOCIDE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM MODELS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the pages that follow I will look at the current international practices on 
genocide prevention and the changes made in light of the previous case studies.  As the 
case studies have exemplified, a slow but significant change has occurred within the 
genocide regime: in particular, the introduction of verbal cues or “framing”1 from the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and practices 
within the United Nations structure have furthered genocide prevention.  
 
EARLY WARNING AND MONITORING  
Within the genocide studies field significant attention is paid to the factors 
contributing to the outbreak of violence with only a marginal number of scholars actually 
attempting to address its prevention.   In recent years however, scholarly works have 
produced models geared to detecting genocide‟s outbreak, monitoring and response.   
Barbara Harff‟s Risk Assessment model consists of daily monitoring of some 70 
indicators (political, demographic, economic and environmental) which are factored into 
six categories resulting in the assignment of an overall score for each country.  The 
countries receive a yearly ranking based on their overall scores and are separated into 
three risk levels.  As a result of genocide‟s dynamic nature, Harff utilizes accelerators, 
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de-accelerators and triggers to explicate the short term factors that contribute to 
genocide‟s occurrence.2    
Harff‟s accelerators and de-accelerators are “variables operationalized as events 
that typically increase [or decrease] the level or significance of the most volatile of the 
background and intervening conditions… often develop[ing] a momentum of their own 
capable of escalating [or decreasing] a crisis.”3   Additionally, Harff utilizes triggers, 
“significant single events whose occurrence is likely… to propel a crisis to the next phase 
of escalation,”4 as the “tipping point” or catalyst to the outbreak of genocidal violence.  
Because these factors are often short term events that can exacerbate or reduce the 
tensions within a society, they add to the rankings and serve as an immediate reflection of 
the situation on the ground. 
5
   
Barbara Harff‟s structural risk assessment model‟s ability to identify long-term 
structural factors or indicators that predict the likely onset of a genocide or politicide has 
contributed to the assessment of developing situations.  However, the model is labor 
intensive, emphasizes macro-structural indicators, is time sensitive and costly, and so is 
of limited utility to the international community.  The use of accelerators, de-accelerators 
and triggers limits timely action.  As a result of her inclusion of politicides in her risk 
assessment model, use of her model can be highly controversial and problematic.  More 
importantly, her model lacks the explanatory power needed by UN organs to mobilize 
international action.  It is however, the first of its kind to be utilized by the United States 
Political Instability Task Force to predict escalating violence or instability.   
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 Steven C. Poe, Nicolas Rost and Sabine C. Carey‟s risk assessment model 
represents one of the most inclusive models.  In gearing their model toward early warning 
and reporting of all humanitarian situations, they include a country‟s experience on six 
dimensions (past repression, democracy, economic development, population size, 
involvement in international or civil war)
6
 as well as its annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) and population growth.
7
  The countries are then grouped into three categories 
based on their likely human rights record.
8
   
Poe, Rost and Carey‟s model is interesting and ambitious but is inundated with 
information as a result of their attempts to be inclusive.  Their findings do not translate 
into accessible information for policymakers and so inhibits the ability to constructively 
engage in genocide prevention.  Furthermore, this model has not been articulated beyond 
this article or implemented. 
In 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated “that there can be no more 
important issue and no more binding obligation than the prevention of genocide.”9  In 
commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan laid out his Five Point Action Plan to end genocide:  
(a) preventing armed conflict; 
(b) Protection of civilians in armed conflict including a 
mandate for United Nations peacekeepers to protect 
civilians; 
(c) Ending impunity through judicial action in both 
national and international courts; 
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(d) Early and clear warning of situations that could 
potentially degenerate into genocide and the 
development of a United Nations‟ capacity to analyse 
and manage information; 
(e) And swift and decisive action along a continuum of 
steps.
10
 
 
Annan‟s five point plan served as the basis for significant activity within the United 
Nations aimed at ending the occurrence of genocide.    
Acting under Security Council resolution 1366 (2001), Annan created the Office 
of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (later changed to the Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, SAPG).  The international 
community‟s reception was mixed as some Member States viewed it as furthering 
imperialist policies, while others saw it as the commitment to the responsibility to 
protect. 
The Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) was given the 
mandate to: 
(a) collect existing information, in particular from within 
the United Nations system, on massive and serious 
violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin  
(b) act as an early warning mechanism to the Secretary-
General  
(c) make recommendations to the Security Council on 
actions to prevent or halt genocide and  
(d) liaise with the United Nations system on activities for 
the prevention of genocide.
11
 
 
                                                 
10
 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 62
nd
 Session. Commission on Human Rights. Report of the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of the Five Point Action Plan and the activities of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.” 9 March 2006. 
(E/CN.4/2006/84).  Official Record.  New York, 2006, pp. 3. 
11
 United Nations Security Council.  Letter dated 12 July 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. Supp. 567. (S/2004/567).  Official Record. New York, 2004. 
   
72 
The first Special Advisor, Juan Mendez, worked on a part-time basis to tackle the 
difficult task of spearheading the United Nations genocide prevention agenda and 
practices.  Under his guidance the inner workings of the office‟s early warning system, 
global risk assessment and communication practices were sketched out.   
In an attempt to understand the nature of genocide then SAPG Juan Mendez 
found linkages between genocide prevention and comprehensive action in the areas of:  
(a) The protection of populations at risk against serious or 
massive violations of human rights or humanitarian 
law; 
(b) the establishment of accountability for violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law; 
(c) the provision of humanitarian relief and access to basic 
economic, social, and cultural rights; and 
(d) the initiation and support of steps to address underlying 
causes of conflict through peace agreements and 
transitional processes
12
 
 
The findings pointed to the need for fluidity in the United Nations short and long term 
human rights work toward eliminating conditions conducive to genocide.  The findings 
were instrumental in molding how the Special Advisors office would assess possible 
early warning systems and its own larger role in the United Nations.  
Borrowing Woocher‟s definition, the SAPG defined early warning as: 
The collection, analysis and communication of information 
about escalatory developments in situations that could 
potentially lead to genocide, crimes against humanity or 
massive and serious war crimes, far enough in advance for 
relevant UN organs to take timely and effective preventive 
measures.
13
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The SAPG views early warning as a crucial part of the operational and strategically 
important preventive practices.  The SAPG emphasized the role of member states and 
tools at their disposal as crucial to the formulation of an effective early warning system.  
Key to an effective system is timely information, based on immediate to medium term 
indicators, in order to allow policymakers the time to strategically plan for specific 
outcomes. The SAPG argued that allowing policymakers and UN organs to have early 
engagement requires less political will and resources and entails fewer risk to the UN 
Member States.  Their work has reformulated how prevention is viewed and the risk and 
costs associated with it.   
The office of the SAPG, run at the time of writing Francis Deng, primarily utilizes 
the Inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive 
Action as a significant source of its information.  The “Framework Team,” composed of 
entities in the peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance sectors, is 
seen as the ideal network within the United Nations structure to influence the Special 
Advisor‟s work.14  The Special Advisor‟s office also utilizes reports by the Economic and 
Social Council, Human Rights Council, Council on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and a number of other organs of the United Nations for relevant 
information as well as field operatives.   
In exploring early warning systems the independence of the Special Advisor‟s 
genocide early warning system was crucial.  The Special Advisor‟s office evaluated early 
warning and monitoring options based on a sense of credibility and independence from 
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Member State influence.  Among the models explored and rejected were Barbara Harff‟s, 
Poe, Rost and Carey‟s, and Woolf and Hulsizer‟s.  Woolf and Hulsizer‟s Psychosocial 
Roots to Genocide Model argues that seven stages of violence are accompanied by seven 
parallel processes.  In Woolf and Hulsizer‟s model identification of legal/ political 
practices which evolve into genocidal violence are products of psychosocial processes 
that condition society‟s dehumanization and moral disengagement and exclusion of the 
victim group (see table 4.1).  A number of other models were rejected for their lack of 
explanatory power.  Most important to the SAPG‟s assessment however, was the possible 
threat that information could leak before the office was able to address the conflict. 
 
Table 4.1: Adaptation of Woolf and Hulsizer’s Psychosocial Roots Model 
 
 
 
Source: Linda M. Woolf & Michael R. Hulsizer.  “Psychosocial Roots of Genocide: Risk, Prevention, and 
Intervention.”  Journal of Genocide Research 7(1), (March 2005): 101-128.  
 
Levels of Violence
Hate Crimes and 
Institutionalized Bias
Loss of Opportunity and 
Privilege
Loss of Civil Rights
Isolation
Loss of Human Rights
Loss of Existence
Denial
Psychosocial Processes
Culture of Violence and 
Ideology of Supremacy
Stigmatization
Dehumanization
Moral Disengagement
Moral Exclusion
Impunity
Perpetration of Violence
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The 2005 World Summit Heads of States and Government pledged to assist the 
United Nations with the establishment of an early warning capacity and stressed the role 
of early warning in providing for “peaceful and preventive measures” and “a 
differentiated assessment of the circumstances of each case.”15  The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has also made efforts to work toward the 
elimination of genocide through its October 2005 Declaration on the Prevention of 
Genocide and follow up report, Decision on Follow-up to Declaration on the Prevention 
of Genocide: Indicators of Patterns of Systematic and Massive Racial Discrimination.  
CERD has committed itself to working closely with the SAPG and has laid out 15 
indicators of genocide.  These indicators measure practices of dehumanization and 
political disenfranchisement or exclusion that makes genocide possible.  Additionally, the 
Economic and Social Council‟s Commission on Human Rights published a March 2006 
report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, suggesting ways in which the 
international community could address Kofi Annan‟s Five Point Plan toward ending 
genocide.   
 In the years since the creation of the office of the SAPG, the office and the 
international community have made advancements in formulating ways to prevent 
genocide.  In 2006 an Advisory Committee was created to assist the SAPG‟s work.  Since 
its inception the office has become part of the inter-departmental bodies of the Executive 
Policy Committee, and Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others.  In 
addition the office coordinates its work and information collection with the Department 
of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
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(OHCHR), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), among others. Furthermore, it has trained UN personnel to examine 
situations, based on their Analysis Framework, in order to assess the following 
conditions: 
1) Tense inter-group relations, including a record of 
discrimination and/or other human rights violations 
committed against a group; 
2) Weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide, such as 
the lack of an independent judiciary, ineffective 
national human rights institutions, the absence of 
international actors capable of protecting vulnerable 
groups, and a lack of impartial security forces and 
media; 
3) The presence of illegal arms and armed elements; 
4) Underlying political, economic, military or other 
motivation to target a group; 
5) Circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide, 
such as a sudden or gradual strengthening of the 
military or security apparatus; 
6) Acts that could be elements of genocide, such as such 
as killings, abduction and disappearances, torture, rape 
and sexual violence, “ethnic cleansing” or pogroms or 
the deliberate deprivation of food; 
7) Evidence of the “intent to destroy in whole or in part”; 
8) Triggering factors, such as elections.16 
 
To strengthen their work the SAPG has linked the conditions found in the Analysis 
Framework with international law in an attempt to “package[e] a diverse range of legal 
provisions from different international legal instruments which, together, will provide 
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detailed guidance on the range of legal provisions that need to be respected in order to 
prevent genocide.”17  
 
FLOW OF INFORMATION 
The Special Advisor‟s position was upgraded in importance under the tenure of 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, to the level of Under-Secretary-General and to a full 
time commitment.   Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also created the Special Advisor on 
the Responsibility to Protect, which receives guidance, and coordinates with, and reports 
to the SAPG.  As a result of its close working relationship with the Secretary-General the 
Special Advisor‟s office is able to directly communicate critical information to the 
Secretary-General and in turn to the Security Council.  The access given to the Secretary-
General and the President of the Security Council allows for crucial information to be 
disseminated quickly and for important situations to be placed on the UN‟s agenda.  
Furthermore, as already described, its cooperative relationship with a number of UN 
bodies allows for information sharing and coordination to take place in order to aid states 
in resolving the conditions of conflict. 
Security Council Resolution 1366, the resolution which serves as the basis for 
SAPG‟s mandate, requests reports on “cases of serious violations of international law, 
including international humanitarian law, and human rights law” and gives the Special 
Advisor the ability to avoid some of the hardest questions regarding genocide prevention 
and identification.  In its inclusion of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law the Security Council removed the power to “make a determination on whether 
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genocide within the meaning of the convention had occurred”18 from the Special 
Advisor‟s office.  Instead the Special Advisor brings to the attention of the Secretary-
General and Security Council “any situation where identifiable groups were at risk of 
mass-killing or other forms of destruction.”19  Such an expanded interpretation of cases 
relevant to the SAPG‟s work is consistent with the wishes of the UN Member States 
expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.   Further, this led to the 
inclusion of “Mass Atrocities” in the title of the office in 2007.   
From the outset the Special Advisor‟s role was envisioned as behind the scenes or 
employing “quiet diplomacy.”20  Yet while compatible with states‟ wishes, these 
activities prohibit situations from being appropriately labeled genocide and thus binding 
states to action.  As a result dominant practices largely trap information on escalating 
situations within the UN body.  Situations that do not serve the interest of various 
Security Council Members do not necessarily draw Member State condemnation or 
international attention.  The guarded way in which crucial information regarding volatile 
situations within the UN organ is treated, limits civil society‟s engagement.  It limits the 
ability of civil society to fully comprehend international developments and to serve as an 
internal pressure group to mobilize states to prevent genocide. 
 In recent years, civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have 
increasing played a role in disseminating information regarding conflict and human rights 
violations.  In fact a number of UN organs have noted the important role civil society and 
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NGOs have had in bringing about changes to humanitarian situations.  Through the use of 
YouTube, social media and other forums, knowledge has been disseminated in such a 
way as to allow for civil society‟s empowerment.  Non-governmental organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and the US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, for example, have played a role in informing the general public about 
escalating situations.  Via this forum, civil society is able to create international action 
networks/campaigns. For example, significant civil society mobilization played a crucial 
role in the eventual response to the Darfur conflict. 
 
RESPONSE MECHANISMS 
 Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer‟s model already described identifies 
seven stages of violence accompanied by seven parallel processes.
21
 These seven stages 
and processes are then divided into four categories of responses.  Their work, however, 
remains significantly conceptual which does not provide real policy prescriptions.  
Further, their primary prevention mechanisms is unrealistic because the seven stages 
identified, in the levels of violence and the seven processes are so common that the 
international community cannot connect all of them to a viable option.  Gregory Stanton 
and John G. Heidenreich commit similar errors in their stages of prevention.
22
 
Benjamin A. Valentino argues that “because small groups can play such a central 
role in causing mass killings… pre-existing cleavages, hatred and discrimination between 
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groups, and non-democratic forms of government are of limited utility in distinguishing 
societies at high risk for mass killing.”23  As a result he advocates a more targeted 
response by the international community.  According to Valentino responses to prevent 
mass killings must “focus on disarming and removing from power the small groups and 
leaders responsible for instigating and organizing the killings.”24  This approach most 
closely resembles smart sanctions which focus on the travel and economic interest of 
individuals involved with the genocide.  As Adeno Addis argues sanctions serve an 
ideational and instrumental role in international politics.  Further, Addis argues that 
“invoking a legal norm… is [done] to signal the boundaries of the community, to mark 
publicly what is central to the identity of the community and what are the negations of 
that identity.”25  However, the international community has double victimized civilians as 
sanctioning practices have often failed to distinguish between the offending regime and 
the state, resulting in economic stagnation, food shortages and other costly effects.  
 With the shift toward a responsibility to protect (R2P) the international 
community has taken significant steps toward greater awareness of escalating situations 
and employing a tempered preventive mechanism which views intervention as a last 
resort.   The United Nations and a number of the authors cited have placed emphasis on 
exhausting all diplomatic, humanitarian and economic tools available before the use of 
force is even considered.   
Once information regarding human rights abuses is known, it is important that 
policymakers take a mixed approach of pressure and diplomacy toward deterring the 
                                                 
23
 Benjamin A. Valentino. Final Solution: Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20
th
 Century.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. 
24
 Ibid, pp. 243. 
25
 Adeno Addis.  “Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil.” Human Rights Quarterly, 25(3), (August 
2003): 573-623, pp. 587. 
   
81 
violence.  Gareth Evans illustrates how such an approach can be adopted (see table 4.2).  
He presents a mixture of structural and direct political, social, legal and security practices 
that are intended to bring about change.  A policy of pressure was exhibited by the United 
States once details of the Darfur case became public.  The US move to place an arms 
embargo and economic sanctions on the Sudanese government are hallmarks of strong 
diplomatic engagement.  Not only does such an approach send a clear statement to the 
given government that such abuses will not be tolerated but it reduces the resources made 
available to the government to buy the weapons to carry out their plans.   
Humanitarian approaches must be employed at the same time that such hard-line 
positions are taken.  By offering humanitarian aid, logistical or technological training and 
favorable support for entry into a committee or organization, states can provide 
incentives toward easing the violence.  These activities however, must be mixed with 
concessions made by the offending government toward reducing the human rights abuses.  
Among the concessions needed for the supply of these favors is the need for UN 
peacekeeping personnel or goodwill ambassadors to have access to the population to 
gauge the reduction of tensions.   
An interesting opinion voiced by Benjamin A. Valentino, is the need for 
permissive emigration of the targeted population during genocide to reduce lives lost.  
This position is a noble stance but with the significant destabilization of the sub-Saharan 
region as a result of the spillover cost of the Rwandan genocide and Darfur crisis it is 
hard to see how this practice would add to international peace and security. 
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Table 4.2:  Adaptation of Evan's Preventive Toolbox 
 
Structural Direct 
  
 Promote good governance 
 Promote membership into  
       international organization  
 
 Preventive  diplomacy 
 Threat of political sanctions 
 
P
o
litical 
 Support economic development 
 Support education for tolerance 
 Community peace building 
 
 Aid conditionality 
 Threat of economic sanctions 
 Economic incentives 
 
So
cial 
 Promote fair constitutional  
       structures 
 Promote human rights 
 Promote rule of law 
 Fight corruption 
 
 Legal dispute resolution 
 Threat of international criminal 
prosecution 
 
Legal 
 Security sector reform 
 Military to civilian governance 
 Confidence-building measure 
 Small arms and light weapons control 
 
 Preventive deployment 
 Non-territorial show of force 
 Threat of arms embargo or end of 
military cooperation programs 
 
Secu
rity 
Source: Gareth J. Evans.. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2009. p. 58. 
 
The new concept, responsibility to protect, emphasizes the need to judge 
intervention on whether actions taken are based on just cause.  Evans and Sahnoun 
emphasize the need to evaluate the decision to intervene on the principles of right 
intention, last resort, proportionate means, and a reasonable prospect for success.
26
  
According to Pattison, humanitarian intervention is a double-edged sword that can hurt or 
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improve the UN‟s standing, as well as that of international law, weaken order and 
destabilize and damage the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
27
   
 A major failure that can be found in the responsibility to protect is that it leaves us 
with the same exact problem we had before its inception.  While R2P may have made the 
walk up to the problem more interesting and vibrant, we still encounter the same 
difficulties when intervention is discussed.  Similar to its predecessor, humanitarian 
intervention, it fails to give us an answer to who should intervene, with whose authority 
intervention is undertaken with a banner of legitimacy and what are the constraints to 
such an intervention. 
James Pattison stresses the need to identify to whom claims regarding the 
responsibility to react should be directed because this would prevent unnecessary delays.  
In his evaluation Pattison argues that the actor with the most legitimacy based on the 
likely effectiveness of its operations bears the duty of carrying out a humanitarian 
operation to save lives.  He argues that legitimacy does not necessarily entail full 
legitimacy in order to carry out operations but that an adequate degree of legitimacy is 
central to this work.  In the end, he argues that an organization best situated to receive 
internal and external consent from local and global actors and has the military capacity to 
effect change would be most effective in carrying out military operations.
28
   
In order to comply with international law, the resort to intervention/ use of force 
must be authorized by the UN Security Council when possible. Pattison argues that when 
legitimacy is “used in conjunction with humanitarian intervention, legitimacy is used to 
mean that humanitarian intervention is legal, accepted by the international community, 
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procedurally justified, authorized by the Security Council, and/or morally justifiable.”29  
However, when this is not possible the Secretary General advises that the General 
Assembly be used as a supplement to Security Council authorization.  The Secretary-
General argues that “the General-Assembly may exercise a range of related functions 
under Article 10 to 14, as well as under the “Uniting for Peace” process set out in its 
resolution 377(V).”30  But, these are more optimistic views on getting a variety of states 
with significant insecurities to consent to intervention.  As Darfur exemplifies, states 
have stood at quite different ends when it comes to intervention and state sovereignty.  
The lag in response to the Darfur crisis was largely a result of different views of 
sovereignty rights within the G-8 and within significant groupings of states.  The 
international community‟s emphasis on legality as opposed to legitimacy of intervention, 
Pattison argues, is not the best course to ensure action.  Action that is necessary though 
not necessarily approved by the Security Council may be taken in exceptional cases.   
From a policy perspective, Gary J. Bass argues that intervening states should 
identify situations based on what he terms “spheres of humanitarian interest” and should 
avoid direct confrontation with other great powers.
31
  Evans and Sahnoun advocate an 
assessment of the intervention‟s feasible outcome.   Orna Ben- Naftali argues that 
assessment must look at:  
(i) the geographical distance of the state concerned from 
the scene of the events; (ii) the strength of the political and 
other links between the state and the main actors in the 
event; (iii) the state‟s legal position vis-à-vis the situation 
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and the persons facing the danger or reality of genocide; 
and (iv) the states level of awareness.
32
 
 
Ben-Naftali places primary emphasis on the ability of the intervening state to influence 
change within the given regime regarding the genocidal policy.   
Furthermore, when intervention is to take place, restraint is a requisite for action.  
John Janzekovic argues that intervention must have “clear political and strategic 
directives, realistic mission goals and achievable military objectives before forceful 
intervention should even be considered.”33  As Finnemore argues, intervention 
increasingly depends on a multilateral approach.
34
   Further, interventions must be limited 
to reducing the casualties and are not to affect the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a state.    As the Brahimi Report highlights, it is crucial that UN 
missions realistically access the likely outcome of actions in order to make sure that 
missions are given a greater chance of success.  
Regional and hybrid peacekeeping initiatives have increasingly become the norm.  
Yet, a number of these regional organizations still lack the resources and logistical and 
communication capacities to effectively enforce the peace.  There have been a variety of 
attempts to create standby military capacities.  However, states have been inconsistent in 
their rhetorical statements and their actual financial and resource contributions.  As the 
Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), United Nations Standby Arrangements 
System (UNSAS), and United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) indicates the 
international community is still unprepared and unwilling to take such steps.  A number 
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of efforts to create a standby rapid deployment entity to carry out UN authorized forcible 
intervention have been short lived as they have lacked the vision, leadership, and member 
state support needed to make them a fixture in the international arena.  In 2010 the 
African Union would took steps to “operationaliz[e] Article 4 (H) of its Constitutive 
Act”35 by establishing the African Standby Force.  Additionally, there has been a growing 
trend within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and among some developed 
states to provide regional and institutional capacity building, transportation and logistical 
support, peacekeeping training and equipment.   
The poor record found in the genocides of the 1990s forced the United Nations to 
conceptualize ways of deterring the crime while “recogniz[ing] and fully respect[ing] the 
sovereignty of States.”36  Academic models give us innovative ways of looking at 
genocide prevention, but they are incompatible with the resources and goals of the 
international organizations capable of carrying out genocide prevention.  Annan‟s Five 
Point Plan was a catalyst for dramatic changes within the United Nations.  With the 
introduction of the idea of a Responsibility to Protect and the creation of the Office of the 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide the international community finally had 
the framework to examine and monitor ongoing conflict, disseminate information and 
serve as a catalyst for action within the international system.  Still, forcible intervention 
lacked the proper framework needed to make it an ongoing feature of the international 
system.  The current practices exhibited by NATO, the US‟s Global Peace Operations 
                                                 
35
 United Nations The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.  “Work of the Office: 
Engaging with Partners.”  http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser/engagement_partners.shtml 
36
 United Nations General Assembly.  Human Rights Council, 7
th
 Session.  Annual Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and 
the Secretary-General. (A/HRC/7/37). Official Record.  New York, 2008. 
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Initiative (GPOI) and the AU‟s African Standby Forces may be an innovative approach to 
carrying out forcible intervention to prevent genocide.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Since the international community committed to preventing and punishing the 
crime of genocide more than 50 years ago, academics, policymakers, and lawyers have 
expressed pessimism in their assessments regarding the community‟s commitment and 
the likelihood of the realization of these goals.  In an international system characterized 
by its anarchic nature and the centrality of states in effecting the realization and progress 
of a range of issues, human rights and human dignity have long struggled to find a proper 
foot hold.   
The work and goals of the human rights field express an ideal or moral 
perspective of how the international system should be.  Theorists have forwarded a view 
of the rights, respect and opportunities that the world‟s community should be able to 
enjoy.  Yet at times those framing the discussion have talked about these ideals in ways 
that are significantly inconsistent with states‟ will.  The framing of human rights and 
human dignity has often leaned toward a utopian ideal.  A number of the academic 
genocide prevention/response mechanisms imply Security Council reform, the creation of 
independent standing military forces, the democratization of the world, the adoption of 
open immigration policies and/or re-educating and sensitizing society.  In many regards 
some of the arguments are logical but still speak of reforms or practices that are not in 
sync with the current international order.  Furthermore, they will likely not be in sync for 
at least the next ten years. 
The discussion of human rights and human dignity has continuously conflicted 
with the dominant international order or power distribution.  In arguing for the reform of 
the Security Council, for example, some scholars have ignored the interest of many states 
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in maintaining the current international order.  We have continuously framed progress in 
these issue areas in ways which seem unrealistic to states and which conflict with how 
they have come to understand their own identities and rights. 
Human rights and human dignity have also conflicted with the ways in which we 
have come to discuss state sovereignty rights.  Human rights remains a highly 
controversial topic which fails to find universality or acceptability among the over 190 
states within the international system.   A central problem is that the discussion of human 
rights has moved the state from enjoying unbound rights to being responsible for 
“services” to its citizens.  At times human rights and dignity have been framed as a 
burden on states, requiring states to ensure the enjoyment of rights that administratively 
and structurally they are unprepared to provide.  Other times the issue has been viewed as 
an impingement of the integrity of the state‟s sovereign rights.    
At the other end of the spectrum are dominant theories within the international 
relations field that have taken a rather static and short term approach to human rights and 
human dignity.  These theories have emphasized the instant needs and wants of states 
without taking a forward looking approach to the potential present in the current 
international order to ensure that the conditions for long term stability and security are 
met.  Their emphasis on the immediate conditions and payoffs enjoyed by states has 
increasingly failed to acknowledge the detrimental effects of mass violations of human 
rights and conflict.   
In the end dominant human rights theorists and international relations theorists 
have spoken at different ends of the spectrum regarding these issues.  The international 
relations emphasis on the here and now and the human rights discussion of future ideals 
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fail to honestly discuss what reforms and practices must be instituted to meet both of their 
needs in the here and now.  Bruce Cronin‟s International Protection Regimes (IPR) 
attempts to overcome the stagnation that has immobilized the international community.  
Cronin‟s emphasis is on the common good or international welfare that is at the heart of 
“altruistic” human rights policy.  Finnemore and Sikkink‟s discussion of the norms life 
cycle helps us put developments into perspective and guides human rights theorists 
working toward realizing their goals.  All three of our case studies are testament to the 
need for a wakeup call.  The Rwandan genocide‟s origin in the ongoing conflict within 
Burundi and its spillover into neighboring states forces us to reconsider the logic and 
effectiveness of state centric assessments of human rights/ human dignity concerns.    
Furthermore, the international community‟s rather inconsistent and meager track 
record with regard to genocide and mass atrocities should not be the final verdict when it 
comes to human rights and human dignity.  Cutting across all three case studies are a lack 
of political will, poor communication/ dissemination practices, and uncoordinated 
responses.  Yet there is a discernable change from case to case.   
Without a doubt the Rwandan genocide was clearly an all out failure.  In terms of 
non-military intervention (such as economic sanctions, state pressure to halt the violence, 
etc.), military intervention, and international condemnation there was no action.  The 
international community failed to take significant corrective action in the wake of the 
genocide as states continued to reiterate their own interest in guiding policy.   The only 
moderate success originating from the conflict was the creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute crimes, which has helped clarify the 
Genocide Convention. 
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In contrast the Bosnian case study exhibits greater engagement and commitment 
on the part of the international community.  The European Community (EC), United 
Nations (UN), Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
were all involved in the conflict. The greater involvement of international organizations 
meant that a more powerful and inclusive peacekeeping operation was organized.  The 
international community organized a number of conferences, meetings and peace plans in 
an attempt to mediate the peace. The international community‟s introduction and 
adoption of “UN Safe Zones” as an attempt to protect the civilian population was a moral 
act.  While failing to live up to the high expectations of their “altruistic” policies, the 
international community‟s adoption of the UN Safe Zones was a significant step in a 
conflict situation.  Though they failed to properly formulate policy and practices for an 
effective UN Safe Zone, their policies were representative of an ideal or moral good.  
Further, the presence of military forces in the form of NATO air support was a significant 
step forward from the total lack of action in the Rwandan conflict.  Moreover, the 
mandate of the peace keeping troops was more significant than in the Rwandan example. 
However, if the progress seen in Bosnia was the barometer for the Darfur conflict, 
the international community‟s engagement during the peak of the conflict can easily be 
viewed as a failure.  The international community ignored reports of the escalating 
conflict within the Darfur region and failed to act to halt the violence.  Yet the strength of 
the Darfur case is without a doubt found in the years after.   As the United Nations 
struggled to pass a resolution which would allow for the rectification of the situation, the 
African Union (AU) and NATO mediated the conflict during 2004-2007.  A significant 
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force in pressuring Security Council members to take a harsher stance with the Sudanese 
government was civil society which has increased its links with the UN and other IOs.  
Also, the United States and UN established their own independent inquiry on the 
situation in Darfur in order to better understand the nature of the conflict.  As a result of 
the findings of the inquiry, referral of the Darfur case was made to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and indictments of a number of individuals were issued.  Three 
men have been indicted thus far, President Omar al-Bashir, Minister of State for the 
Interior Ahmed Haroun, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed leader.  The more targeted 
approach to halting the violence was reflective of the lessons learned from previous 
conflicts.  Some states independently took action against the Sudanese government when 
the UN Security Council was deadlocked by the opposition of China.  Their use of 
economic sanctions and public condemnation of the situation in Darfur served as signals.  
When the Council was finally able to act, a hybrid United Nations- African Union 
peacekeeping operation was created.  This approach also reflected lessons learned by the 
international community as practices were more sensitive and aware of the conditions of 
the Sudanese society.  Further, the use of a peace process as an integral part of the 
peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, emphasized the long term nature of the resolution of 
tensions.   
Within the international system itself a discernible change is taking place as 
genocide preventive measures are being embedded into the international structure.  With 
the move away from humanitarian intervention and the move toward a responsibility to 
protect, the international community has moved away from emphasizing states‟ rights to 
emphasizing states‟ responsibility.  The introduction of a responsibility to protect has also 
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bred a more open and richer understanding of intervention.  The work of Gareth Evans 
and Mohamed Sahnoun  has placed a richer constellation of non-forcible intervention 
measures, such as the use of economic sanctions, foreign aid assistance, and logistical/ 
technological/ or educational assistance, on the table for states‟ consideration. The ICISS 
has spread out a responsibility to protect into three pillars: a “responsibility to protect,” a 
“responsibility to react,” and a “responsibility to rebuild.”  In doing so the ICISS has 
allowed for the international community to work on resolving conflicts by seeing what 
aspects of the concept are generally agreeable and what are not.  In many regards, the 
responsibility to protect is an example of Finnemore and Sikkink‟s norm cycle “framing.” 
The creation of the Special Advisor‟s Office on the Prevention of Genocide 
(SAPG) as part of the Secretary-General‟s office and its reports to the Security Council 
ensures that escalating situations receive greater attention.  As a result of its participation 
within the “Framework” and its coordination with a number of UN offices, the SAPG is 
able to translate awareness of situations into consistent approaches to diffusing tensions 
and assisting states in meeting their responsibility to protect.  
As a result of the Brahimi and New Horizon reports, UNDPKO has been able to 
learn from its mistakes and more effectively and wisely carry out its peacekeeping 
missions.  The growing hybridity of peacekeeping operations, as exhibited in Darfur‟s 
United Nations- African Union UNAMID mission, ensures that peacekeeping is more  
sensitive and in tune with the states‟ needs/ nature.  Other developments within the 
international system are greater engagement with civil society and the use of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
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Yet there is still work to be done.  The UN system is still inadequately prepared to 
collect and analyze information regarding conflict.  In fact it lags behind a significant 
number of member states in its ability to collect information.  This reality is aggravated 
by its need to remain neutral.   It has increasingly failed to establish a clear hierarchy for 
information sharing which would enable those with the ability to place pressure on 
member states to receive such information on a timely basis.  Furthermore, as a result of 
its tendency to down play the role of the Special Advisor‟s office the UN has failed to 
clearly communicate to its members what the office is intended to do.  It has silenced the 
work of the Special Advisor‟s office and weakened the UN‟s ability to effect tangible 
change.
1
 
In addition, true action is stultified in the bureaucratic trappings of the Security 
Council.   With respect to the responsibility to react, the UN lacks the peacekeeping 
troops, and resources to successfully carry out a number of its peace keeping operations.
2
  
Lacking the logistical and communication capacities to fulfill their mandates, 
peacekeeping troops have had to innovate in order to survive- creating regional command 
centers and sharing scarce resources such as helicopters.  Moreover, its peacekeeping 
operations in the African continent have lacked strong support and contribution from 
Western States.  Attempts made to establish standing armies for the United Nations and 
others have continued to fail.  
So how do we rectify these problems?  The spectrum of responsibility and 
responses available to the international community must be fully embraced and 
                                                 
1
 Payam Akhavan. “Report on the Work of the Office of the Special Advisor of the United Nations 
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.” Human Rights Quarterly, 28(4), (November 2006): 
1043-1070.  
2
 James Pattison. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? 
Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010. 
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implemented.  States must start addressing conflicts before they boil over into mass 
atrocities and genocide.  By utilizing peaceful diplomatic avenues to halting violence, 
states can increase peace without necessarily increasing the cost attached to doing so.  
The international community must emphasize the ongoing coordination of the United 
Nations with other organizations, such as the African Union and International Criminal 
Court. By doing so consistent messages and practices start to take form.  The Special 
Advisor‟s Office must take a more active role in communicating its mandate.  It must 
engage with member states to activate partnerships toward a better world.  The SAPG 
must take a stronger role in the collection of data on conflictual situations and create 
alternative networks to mobilizing a response when the Security Council is visibly 
unwilling to take action. 
When peaceful means are ineffective, limited strategic military intervention must 
be taken but only as a last resort.  The hybridity of UN peacekeeping is a good step 
forward.  By strengthening regional and local forces to tackle the difficult task of 
peaceful enforcement we are contributing to regional stability.  Western states and NATO 
must play a more active role in helping regional organizations build up their 
peacekeeping operations and assist them in implementing more effective logistical and 
communication capacities.  
 With the end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnically based violence in the 
1990s the international community was forced to confront its failure to operationalize a 
preventive mechanism stipulated in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  The 1994 Rwandan, 1995 Bosnian, and 2003 
Sudanese genocides taught us the large financial and human cost of poor political will 
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and idling.  With the introduction of verbal cues, UN bodies, and innovative new 
approaches to preventive diplomacy, intervention and peacekeeping, the international 
community has made significant strides in formulating a solid genocide prevention 
regime.  But there is still work to be done.  Among other things, the international 
community must continue to work to improve and diversify peacekeeping operations, 
support states in their responsibility to protect, and engage civil society.
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Appendix 1: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
 
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948. 
 
Article 1 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in 
time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to 
punish. 
 
Article 2 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such: 
 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Article 3 
The following acts shall be punishable: 
 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide. 
 
Article 4 
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals. 
 
Article 5 
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective 
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3. 
 
Article 6 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be 
tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, 
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 
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Article 7 
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political 
crimes for the purpose of extradition. 
 
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force. 
 
Article 8 
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take 
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article 3. 
 
Article 9 
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to 
the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
 
Article 10 
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948. 
 
Article 11 
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of 
any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation 
to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. 
 
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any 
Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an 
invitation as aforesaid. 
 
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
 
Article 12 
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or 
any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is 
responsible. 
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Article 13 
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been 
deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy of it 
to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States 
contemplated in Article 11. 
 
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of 
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession. 
 
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective 
on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession. 
 
Article 14 
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of 
its coming into force. 
  
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting 
Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current 
period. 
 
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
 
Article 15 
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should 
become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on 
which the last of these denunciations shall become effective. 
 
Article 16 
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any 
Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-
General. 
 
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such 
request. 
 
Article 17 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United 
Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following: 
 
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article 11; 
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12; 
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with 
Article 13; 
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(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14; 
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15; 
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16. 
 
Article 18 
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United 
Nations. 
 
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United 
Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11. 
 
Article 19 
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations on the date of its coming into force. 
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